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Abstract
This thesis investigates China’s use of the Hong Kong economy taking as its 
framework China’s reliance on Hong Kong to act as its international financial centre. 
China has consistently addressed Hong Kong from the standpoint of Hong Kong’s 
utility to the Chinese economy, from the initiation of China’s economic refonns through 
the negotiations for Hong Kong’s sovereignty as well as in the current post-1997 regime 
as Hong Kong operates under China’s auspices. Hong Kong is a vital component of 
China’s own economy because the enclave manages a majority of its trade and 
investment flows. Hong Kong is able to serve the Mainland precisely because of its 
international standing as a free-market, capitalist enclave. However, while China will 
want to keep the territoiy in its current incarnation (and this intent is signified by the 
promises of the Basic Law), it is China’s involvement in the territory which poses the 
greatest threat to Hong Kong’s status quo. Particularly, Chinese government-owned 
companies in Hong Kong have characteristics which set them apart from any other type 
of foreign businesses in the territory. These business interests provide an alternative 
avenue of power in the teiTitory for the Chinese government, a representation which is 
susceptible to abuse because of the access it provides to Chinese decision-makers and 
the Mainland economy. The tension created by the dichotomy between the socialist and 
capitalist economic systems is vulnerable to exploitation, which could ultimately 
compromise Hong Kong’s economic integrity. The crux of the problem for Hong Kong 
lies in forging a relationship with its new ruling power which will maintain the 
territory’s independent identity and autonomy, which are crucial to maintaining investor 
confidence in Hong Kong. Through an analysis of Chinese investment, Hong Kong is 
shown to be an economy which is increasingly internalised by the mainland.
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i. Introduction
Scope
Hong Kong’s economic and political relationship with the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC, hereafter simply referred to as China or the Mainland) is determined 
by China’s use of the quasi-autonomous territory’s trade and financial mechanisms to 
benefit its own economy. In historical terms, it is a unique circumstance that an 
advanced, capitalist financial centre has had its destiny controlled by a developing 
country lumbering under an authoritarian, communist government. Hong Kong’s 
stability is an issue of primary importance to the wider global economic community 
because of the international role the territory has developed in trade and finance. 
Hong Kong’s ftiture under Chinese rule is without precedent, and therefore there are 
no guidelines to help construct scenarios of the future. China is forging a new path in 
its management of Hong Kong, and doubtless there will be beneficiaries and victims 
in the wake of the changes of regimes.
Hong Kong’s relationship with China is best analysed from the context of 
China’s economic policy toward the territory. A unique relationship has formed 
between unlikely partners which is based upon the one entity serving its master; 
China has and will continue to use the capitalist enclave to strengthen its position on 
the world stage. China’s utilisation of Hong Kong has consequences for the territory 
in terms of its integrity and the maintenance of the territory as a free, open economy. 
Therefore, the model, in the widest sense of this word, of this relationship that is in 
the process of being shaped strongly invites investigation. More precisely, the 
relationship between China and Hong Kong provides a model as to how a socialist
country uses capitalism to develop its own economy and strengthen its state-owned 
corporations.
The relationship between China and Hong Kong informs how both entities 
interact with the world economy. China’s agenda throughout the past twenty years 
has been to nurture Hong Kong as a moneymaking venture for the Mainland to help it 
become an international economic actor. No other developing country benefits from 
the presence of a financial powerhouse under its auspices, and this advantage will 
help catapult China into the realm of major economic players. The smaller actor will 
be somewhat subsumed by the larger actor, giving up some of its own identity to 
serve the goals of the master country.
As the Hong Kong and Chinese economies have increasingly integrated for 
the past twenty years, Hong Kong has served in the capacity as China’s financial 
centre. Business activity in the territory will be profoundly affected by the changing 
nature of the Hong Kong economy as it becomes a capital outlet for business interests 
in China. China’s policy toward Hong Kong stems from a sustained, concerted effort 
to realise economic gains by engaging the international marketplace. While 
maintaining socialism as its guiding principle, the Chinese government must 
encourage massive growth in order to modernise its developing nation, and to do this 
it must attract foreign capital as well as encourage the expansion of its own native 
companies. However, China is systems-deficient and is unable to organise certain 
economic transactions and relationships because the mechanisms for handling foreign 
capital are still largely undeveloped. Chinese companies which are state owned are 
finding avenues of growth m Hong Kong that are restricted in China. Because China 
is Hong Kong’s sovereign, however, there are ramifications for Chinese company 
involvement in the Hong Kong economy.
China's leadeis believe much of Hong Kong’s economic success relies upon 
the extent to which it is able to serve the Chinese economy. Foreign interests use 
Hong Kong as a springboard into China, and as long as there are good investment 
opportunities, then China believes Hong Kong will thrive on the capital it manages 
for China. In this China-centrist view, Hong Kong’s success, as based upon the 
freedom of information, the mle of law, and the hard work of its citizens, is 
marginalised. What matters is China’s own growth; Hong Kong fulfills its raison 
d'etix through its service to China’s economy. This view was expressed by Qiao Shi, 
former head of the National People’s Congress (NFC) of China, when he noted before 
the 1997 handover that the Hong Kong economy would be alright as long as the 
Chinese economy performed well. (Yahuda, 1996, 93)
Fieldwork
To gain a better understanding of the Hong Kong economy and study 
firsthand its operations as an international financial centre, fieldwork was conducted 
over three weeks in Hong Kong in October 1997. To gauge the economic integration 
of Hong Kong and China, my research programme while in Hong Kong involved 
conducting interviews with government officials and members of the community, as 
well as gathering data on Hong Kong’s economy from various government bodies 
and private organisations. I also collected data on the Hong Kong divisions of large 
Chinese conglomerates, or red chips, to examine the extent to which Chinese 
companies have invested in Hong Kong.
Interviews were conducted with a broad spectrum of people active in the 
Hong Kong economy both in the private and public sectors. Interviews with 
government officials included the Deputy Secretary for the Treasury, Mrs. Carrie
Lam, who was in charge of overseeing iho 1997 iransitioiiai arrangements for the 
government budget. I also met with Mr. Chad Leechor, head of Economic Research 
at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Mr. Leechor reaffirmed that the Hong Kong 
government would defend the exchange rate at all costs, and had absolutely no plans 
to devalue the HK$ or de-link it from the US$. Another important contact was the 
director of China trade at the Hong Kong Government Trade Department, whom I 
questioned on the trading relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland.
In the private sector I conducted an interview with Ms. Jeannie Cheung, head 
of China research at Paribas Equity Asia, a fund management firm. I discussed with 
Ms. Cheung the role of the Chinese companies in the Hong Kong economy. Ms. 
Cheung candidly confirmed the desire of the red chips to acquire capital, as well as 
production and managerial experience, through their involvement in the Hong Kong 
economy. Other interviews included the former editor of the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s Business Asia and the director of Asian Infrastructure Fund Advisers.
I earned out research at the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham), 
which is the only Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong that allows any company to 
join regardless of its national origins. AmCham compiles its own data regarding 
business activities in and attitudes about the Hong Kong and Chinese markets, and I 
was able to acquire some of this data for purposes of my research. I also spent 
considerable time at the Hong Kong Trade Development Council Library, which 
stocks enormous amounts of material relevant to Asian business and trade. At the 
HKTDC Library I accessed both primary source (company annual reports, published 
government data) and secondary source (trade publications, journal articles) 
materials.
Research along similar lines in Britain included attending a conference foi 
businesses interested in investing in Hong Kong. I interviewed Sir David Wilson, 
Governor of Hong Kong from 1985-1990, which gave me a fascinating insight into 
the running of the territoiy during the years after Britain had agreed to hand back 
Hong Kong to China. I also met with Sir John Cowperthwaite, former financial 
secretary in the territoiy, with whom I discussed the Hong Kong’s economic 
autonomy under Chinese rule.
Investigating the Chinese economic presence in Hong Kong is a difficult task. 
The extent of Chinese involvement in the Hong Kong economy is troublesome to 
calculate because China does not keep official records of its investment in the 
territory. Furthermore, Hong Kong does not have any constraints on shifting funds, 
nor does it keep any records on capital flows in and out of the territory. The problem 
is compounded by the fact that some Chinese companies with operations in Hong 
Kong are set up illegally, without the consent of the appropriate government office in 
China. Some Chinese businesses use Hong Kong companies or other foreign 
companies as a front for their own organisations. Still other Chinese investments in 
Hong Kong are not even formal companies at all but individuals pursuing their own 
economic interests: this can encompass informal ‘businesses’ which divert goods 
from Chinese factories to the stalls on the Hong Kong market streets or Chinese 
individuals investing in Hong Kong’s stock exchange or property market. Unofficial 
capital outflows such as these often make a ‘round trip’ through Hong Kong in order 
to be reinvested in China disguised as foreign investment, which is subject to special 
breaks and incentives on the Mainland.
The point to be made is that not all Chinese investment is captured by data 
records, and therefore it is useful to supplement the analysis of such investments with
interviews and reports. The following research into Chinese business invoKcment m 
the Hong Kong economy emphasises qualitative methods of analysis, although 
quantitative evidence is utilised to illustrate certain investment activities. Again, 
analyses of the Hong Kong economy and the ways in which it serves the Mainland 
are grounded in both qualitative and quantitative evidence. Research methods such as 
interviews contribute an important dimension to one’s understanding of the data and 
are often important in ascertaining the motivations behind decisions or actions which 
are reflected in reported statistics. This view is expressed by Fielding and Fielding 
(1986, 27) in their assertion that ‘qualitative work can assist quantitative work in 
providing a theoretical framework, validating survey data, interpreting statistical 
relationships and deciphering puzzling responses, selecting survey items to construct 
indices, and offering case study illustrations.’ Field research was therefore vital in 
contributing to a more thorough conceptualisation of China’s use of and involvement 
in Hong Kong’s economy. Research in Hong Kong provided an insight into grey 
areas and allowed a richer, better grounded approach to the analysis of its economy 
than would have been possible by an arm’s length examination.
Themes of existing literature
There are two primary schools of thought which are perpetuated in the extant 
literature on Hong Kong. The first is flilsome in its praise for China’s handling of 
Hong Kong. This literature cites China’s participation in a negotiated settlement; the 
special diplomatic dispensation of creating Hong Kong as a Special Administrative 
Region (SAR) with quasi-autonomy under Chinese sovereignty; the guarantees for 
the maintenance of the status quo drawn up in the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s 
constitution; and China’s deft handling of the territory post-1997, most notable in
China’s absence from the daily life and governance of the territory. The contending 
school of thought encompasses the China critics who are less than confident in 
China’s ability to deftly manage the territory. They point to China’s heavy- 
handedness in dictating the style and content of Hong Kong’s government, the abuse 
of power when it comes to exploiting economic ties and silencing the press, and 
China’s emphasis on territorial integrity in support of which it has not hesitated to use 
military power. China’s official party line has always been that Hong Kong belongs 
to China, and maintaining Hong Kong as a part of China will be an utmost priority in 
any Chinese regime.
In the discussions on the future of Hong Kong, however, rarely are China’s 
intentions viewed in the light of how China can engage the territory as a capitalist 
economy to its own advantage. The literature either argues that China can only 
benefit from Hong Kong if it adopts a hands-off approach, or that China’s active 
involvement in Hong Kong would irrevocably damage the territory’s economy by 
introducing the worst elements of socialism. This dissertation posits that China 
derives innumerable benefits from having a capitalist enclave on its doorstep and that 
it will work to keep Hong Kong functioning as it is, thus the great care invested in 
assuring the status quo for the next fifty years. In this context, however, far from 
adopting a hands-off approach, China actively employs Hong Kong for purposes of 
generating trade and capital for the Mainland, especially thi'ough the operations of 
Chinese conglomerates in the territoiy. China benefits from Hong Kong as an 
international business community, and China has taken steps to ensure that Hong 
Kong operates under a business-minded government and in an atmosphere that is 
conducive to investment. This does not preclude China taking advantage of
economic opportunities in ihe tciTiioiy and using the enclave's systems to foster 
growth on the Mainland.
Whether China is viewed as benign or threatening, the existing literature has 
tended to focus on China’s political motivations for regaining control of Hong Kong. 
There was, however, a very strong economic rationale for China to pursue 
sovereignty of the territoiy. In fact, an economic perspective has governed China’s 
policy toward Hong Kong both pre- and post-handover. While some literature has 
claimed that China has acted capriciously in its dealings with Hong Kong, in fact one 
need only to start from an economic framework to see that China consistently has 
addressed Hong Kong according to Hong Kong’s economic utility to China. It is 
with an understanding of China’s invariable economic policy toward the territory that 
Hong Kong’s relationship with China can be analysed more profitably and the future 
of the territory better conceptualised.
China’s engagement with Hong Kong
China’s development is informed in part by Hong Kong’s capitalist markets. 
Hong Kong’s utility to China resides in its capacity to channel capital to the 
Mainland, and its future depends on its ability to realise this purpose. Hong Kong 
proved itself usefLil to China throughout the century by acting as an economic link for 
China with the rest of the world. China has no such corresponding economic 
powerhouse which is capable of managing the country’s capital requirements. 
Shanghai, once an important business centre, suffered at the hands of the Communists 
and is not in a position to assume the mantle of servicing foreign capital for the 
Chinese economy. When China began to reform its economy in the late 1970s, 
China’s currency was not convertible, its stock markets were non-existent, and the
banking system laboured under the burden of supporting state-owned industries while 
trying to minimise inflation. At the time, Hong Kong had already managed financial 
transactions on behalf of the Mainland, and so China turned to the city to act as its 
financial centre. China knew that it would be decades before any one of its cities 
could acquire the territory’s attributes.
Currently, China is not equipped to mimic the success that Hong Kong has 
achieved, nor is it ideologically prepared to let certain capitalist systems develop 
unfettered on the Mainland. The Communist regime must justify its rule 
economically by providing an improved standard of living for the people, and 
therefore it is heavily dependent upon growth to maintain stability and control of the 
nation. The Chinese Communist government, in order to maintain power, must 
justify the socialist system to the populace; by definition it cannot advocate capitalist 
growth without undermining its own authority. However, it has found that socialism 
by itself has not brought the growth that keeps the Chinese economy going but that it 
is foreign investment and certain private market operations that are providing the fuel 
for the economy and are helping indigenous companies to expand.
China’s understanding of Hong Kong is bounded by the model of how Hong 
Kong has served China, and thus China has made Hong Kong an integral part of its 
economy. Hong Kong’s value to China lies in its ability to flirther the growth of the 
Chinese economy, for example with the capital which is raised in the territory for 
Chinese businesses and projects. China’s new national economic policy, when the 
issue of Hong Kong’s return to China was first raised by Britain in the late 1970s, 
was to implement a series of reforms which would allow China to catch up with 
industrialised nations. As the financial systems and the business community in Hong 
Kong were of great importance to China, its leaders conceived of a role for Hong
Kong to play in teims of helping to speed up the modernisation process. It is no small 
coincidence that when China had begun to open its economy and had started on a 
path of market reforms, Hong Kong’s return to China became an issue. That Hong 
Kong should be a part of China’s process of reform and opening up was apparent 
from the beginning, and China was eager to realise this potential.
Cognizant of the role that Hong Kong had previously played in China’s 
economy, especially with furthering its trading activities, China wanted to harness 
this economic power and use it to the benefit of China’s own growth. It is from this 
stance that China negotiated with Britain for the return of Hong Kong and attained 
sovereignty of the territory. China’s reliance on Hong Kong to service capital and 
manage trade continues to dictate the government’s policy toward the territory post­
handover. In this sense, then, China’s behaviour has not been capricious but 
systematic. China has applied consistent pressure on Hong Kong to hone the desired 
economic relationship. This pressure was exerted against Britain during the 
negotiations in the form of threats of unilateral action, it was brought to bear again as 
China hand-picked a business-orientated government for the territory, and it is 
manifested in the form of Chinese companies muscling their way into the Hong Kong 
economy.
China wants to transform its developing country into a world economic 
power, but it cannot do this without outside assistance and investment. China has a 
crucial reliance upon Hong Kong to help attract this capital as well as to continue to 
act as an entrepot for much of China’s trade. Hong Kong’s system offers reduced 
transaction costs vis-à-vis China in the form of an advanced legal system, which aids 
the negotiating of contracts; a modern, international stock market and banking 
system, which facilitates access to capital, loans, and foreign exchange; a density and
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range of businesses in one relatively compact community; an open information 
industry; and a modern infrastmcture. Each of these components contributes to the 
building of investor confidence in the territory.
China is not handling Hong Kong with kid gloves, then, but is actively 
engaging it in a strategic play to have Hong Kong become an integral part of China’s 
development. China has engaged Hong Kong from one main premise: that Hong 
Kong is the source and conduit for much capital destined for China. Hong Kong as a 
development tool for China is meant to aid and not to corrupt, to contribute to the 
growth of China’s economy and businesses and not to induce upheaval. In this role 
Hong Kong is supposed to act as a sieve, or a window for China to the world, filtering 
through that which is beneficial to the national economy and suppressing subversive 
ideas. Subsequently, China would like Hong Kong to be benign in its political 
activity and virtually non-existent in its political influence on the Mainland. China 
has set a certain role for Hong Kong to play in the future of a united China, and China 
has worked to ensure that Hong Kong will not deviate from these defined perimeters, 
notably by setting up a business-orientated government system in the territory. In the 
negotiations for the handover of Hong Kong, China showed that it was willing to act 
unilaterally in order to have a political system in place which was acceptable to 
China.
China’s official policy toward Hong Kong, that o f ‘one country, two systems’, 
explains the dogged determination of China to keep capitalism ûom dominating or 
replacing the socialist mores which China’s leadership holds dear. So while China is 
willing to use capitalist methods and systems, it will not allow capitalism to depose 
socialism as the prevailing economic paradigm in the still largely developing country. 
This is made evident by the name under which reforms have been conducted in
11
China, socialist market reforms, and by the numerous statements from party officials 
that socialist goals and values should guide the reform path. (Ling, 1996, 13)
Progression of the argument
China uses Hong Kong because it is economically expedient to do so. China’s 
economy undoubtedly benefits from a capitalist financial centre acting as its window 
to the world. While this relationship also benefits Hong Kong, it can be problematic 
because of the tensions which exist between the capitalist and socialist economies. 
These tensions are open to exploitation, and this is the primary danger to Hong 
Kong’s international standing and competitiveness. Hong Kong ultimately is not the 
master of its own fate, and its future path will be largely determined by the purpose 
China expects Hong Kong to serve. Beginning with an examination of how Hong 
Kong came to be passed between British and Chinese hands and the political structure 
under which Hong Kong is governed, the following chapter will show that China 
orchestrated a specific role for Hong Kong to play in Chinese economic development. 
By adhering to this pre-conceived notion of how Hong Kong was to serve the 
Mainland, China systematically organised the manner in which it would acquire and 
govern the territory. Thi'oughout the handover process, China’s methods were 
consistent with its understanding of Hong Kong’s economic utility.
Because China is a developing country, it lacks many of the mechanisms 
which would allow it to manage foreign capital. The third chapter outlines features of 
China’s economy and reveals some of the hurdles which prevent China from fostering 
an advanced financial market on the Mainland. At the root of China’s problems are 
the debt-ridden state-owned corporations; the fallout from closing these enterprises 
would involve mass unemployment. As a direct result of the liquidity generated for
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the purposes of supporting the state-owned, enterprises, the government struggles to 
control inflation to prevent the economy from spinning out of control. Consequently, 
China’s currency is not fully convertible, and stock market activity is restricted. 
China’s nascent systems are ill equipped to deal with the enormous need in the 
Chinese economy for foreign investment, of which Hong Kong is the main source.
Diametrically opposed to China’s burdened economy is the efficient Hong 
Kong market. What China lacks in terms of financial systems Hong Kong is able to 
provide with its wealth of banks, it stock market, and availability of capital. Chapter 
four is a positive analysis of these advanced systems within Hong Kong’s economy, 
emphasising its sound government foundation. Leading on from this, chapter five 
shows how these systems serve China. The argument explores the extent to which 
Hong Kong generates capital for the Mainland and how the city is used by foreign 
investors to access the Chinese economy. Hong Kong facilitates transactions which 
would otherwise prove prohibitive because of the lack of a legal and financial 
network on the Mainland. As a result of its advantages, Hong Kong functions as a 
base for the Chinese overseas community and as the nexus for the Greater Chinese 
economy.
Because of the capital that is managed by Hong Kong, it is natural that 
Chinese companies would come to Hong Kong to access these funds. Chapter six 
examines China’s use of the Hong Kong economy by focusing on Chinese companies 
in Hong Kong. An analysis of Chinese business activity will demonstrate the 
progress of China’s economic expansion into Hong Kong. Chinese companies have 
made substantial inroads into vital industries in Hong Kong, and state-owned 
corporations have become major players in the territory’s economy. This poses a 
threat to the integrity of Hong Kong’s economy because the special ties these
companies have to the Chinese government are vulnerable to exploitation. Various 
Chinese ministries and municipal governments have corporate representation in Hong 
Kong, and thus there is an element of Chinese participation in the territory which is 
neither accounted for in the Basic Law nor answerable to any diplomatic channel 
between Hong Kong and China. These issues receive full examination in chapter 
seven, where implications of extensive Chinese involvement in the Hong Kong 
economy are investigated. The conclusion looks to the future of Hong Kong’s role in 
the world economy and the increasing integration of the Chinese and Hong Kong 
economies.
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i l .  China's plan for H ong Kong
China wanted to regain control of Hong Kong in 1997 for tliree interconnected 
reasons: pride, its one-China policy, and Hong Kong’s economic significance. China 
resented colonial takeover of portions of its territory in the late 1800s, and it was 
anxious to right the wrongs of past ‘unequal’ treaties. The one-China policy of the 
Mainland is related to the issue of pride in that China wants all tenitory that once 
belonged to the Mainland to be united once again. This policy typically refers to 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao, a small colony which is currently controlled by the 
Portuguese under the terms of a nineteenth centuiy treaty and is due to be handed 
back to China in 1999. Finally, but most importantly, China wanted to reunite Hong 
Kong with the Mainland because of its economic value in terms of acting as China’s 
financial centre and facilitating its trade with the rest of the world. It was primarily 
an economic motive that drove China to seek sovereignty of Hong Kong when it did, 
and it was with the understanding of Hong Kong’s importance in servicing the 
Mainland economy that China set about acquiring Hong Kong with a single-minded 
determination. China’s leaders were anxious to reach a negotiated settlement with 
Britain in order to secure investor confidence in the future of the territory; however, 
throughout the negotiations they stuck to the principle of sovereignty of Hong Kong 
which would allow China to create a business government in the territory that would 
be conducive to contributing to Chinese economic growth.
This chapter begins with a summation of the trade disputes which resulted in 
Hong Kong being ceded to Britain. Britain’s acquisition of Hong Kong last century 
is important in understanding why Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997. 
Through a series of treaties in the second half of the nineteenth century Britain came 
to be in possession of Hong Kong island and the peninsular area of Kowloon and the
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New Tenitories io the north. Although the various governmenis of China never 
recognised the validity of these treaties (it was consistently claimed that the treaties 
were the result of colonial aggression and were unfairly imposed upon the Manchu 
dynasty), it was politically and economically convenient to continue to allow Britain 
to rule Hong Kong throughout the twentieth century. When Britain began to worry 
over the future of Hong Kong with regard to the 1997 deadline for its lease of the 
New Territories stipulated by one of these treaties, China came to the conclusion that 
the time was ripe for preparing for the repossession of Hong Kong. From the outset 
of China’s own economic reforms in the late 1970s, China envisioned a role that 
Hong Kong could play to facilitate the Mainland’s growth. Hong Kong’s utility was 
noted in a statement in the mid-1980s in which the head of Hong Kong operations for 
the Bank of China suggested that the excess liquidity in the enclave could be well- 
used on the Mainland. (Rafferty, 1989, 326) A financial centre would be 
instrumental in bolstering the reforms, and it was with this in mind that China framed 
the conditions under which Hong Kong was to be returned.
Early Histoiy
Conflicts over trade with China were the reason Britain sought to occupy 
Hong Kong in the second half of the last century. A strong British presence in Asia 
was established with the formation of the East India Company. Initially trade 
between Britain and China was conducted through the East India Company, which 
had a virtual monopoly on the tea trade. British trading houses set up compounds 
where employees lived and worked in Guangzhou, the southern Chinese city on the 
Pearl River. Foreigners were not allowed to leave the compounds and were only 
allowed to conduct trading tlmee months out of the year. The most profitable trade
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with China was the opium trade: throughout the nineteenth centnr\' opium trade was 
the source of one-third of the total revenue for British India. (Crisswell, 1981, 4) 
The Chinese emperor had banned opium; however, as this trade was particularly 
profitable, merchants such as William Jardine and James Matheson found this a 
convenient way to build up personal fortunes. In the 1830s Jardine and Matheson 
controlled about one-third of foreign trade with China, which largely consisted of the 
illegal running of opium from India to Chinese coastal ports. (Crisswell, 1981, 4)
The so-called ‘Opium Wars’ erupted due to the tensions between British 
merchants, who wanted their trading with China guaranteed, and the Chinese regime, 
which rejected the corrupting influence of western forces and sought to limit trading 
with foreigners. European merchants had frequently run into conflict with Chinese 
forces in Guangzhou over the illegal trade in opium. In an attempt to crack down on 
the illicit trade, an advisor to the Chinese emperor was sent to Guangzhou where he 
established a committee of Chinese merchants, the Co-Hong, which unilaterally set 
up the rules for trade. Foreigners could only conduct trade in Guangzhou and were 
only allowed to trade with China through merchants who had been appointed by the 
Co-Hong. British resistance to these constraints was the cause of militaiy skirmishes 
between Britain and China, as Britain sought to trade with China on its own terms. 
As part of the campaign to evade the restrictions, Britain sought a trading base off the 
Chinese coast where it could put constant pressure on the Chinese authorities to 
negotiate with a representative of Britain to open trade with China and eliminate the 
restrictions set by the Co-Hong. (Crisswell, 1981, 43)
The independent merchants, who believed that a militaiy presence would 
mean better trading terms, advocated the acquisition of a British trading base. In 
March 1839, as a show of resistance by the Chinese who were trying to end the
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opium trade, the foreigneis were blockaded in iheir compounds, and were given an 
ultimatum to hand over their stocks of opium, or trade would be closed at Guangzhou. 
The British Royal Navy engaged in skirmishes with Chinese boats, which they easily 
overcame, and in the resultant treaty Hong Kong was claimed by Britain. Hong Kong 
became a permanent colony of the United Kingdom in 1842 under the Treaty of 
Nanking. With the treaty which ended the second Opium War in 1860, the British 
were granted part of the Kowloon Peninsula to the north of Hong Kong island. The 
Manchu dynasty, already weak from war with Japan, ceded or leased lands to other 
western powers in the 1890s. In this context Britain became anxious to strengthen its 
own position in East Asia, and in June 1898 British acquired a lease of 99 years of the 
New Territories, 355 square miles of rural land directly north of Kowloon. Britain 
agreed to a lease as opposed to an outright cession because other foreign countries at 
that time established the precedent to lease the Chinese lands they had annexed.
British control of the territory which constituted Hong Kong for the next 99 
years (excluding a period of Japanese occupation during WWII) was to provide an 
oasis of relative stability and modernisation on China’s coast. Because of the turmoil 
in China during much of this century, it was expedient to continue to allow Britain to 
run Hong Kong, and as a consequence, Hong Kong forged a radically different 
development path from that of the Mainland. Throughout this period Hong Kong 
found its niche in service to China, and China undoubtedly benefited from Hong 
Kong’s status being separate from that of China.
Negotiations
Thus British control of Hong Kong remained unchallenged for much of the 
twentieth centuiy, as it was economically and politically convenient for China to have
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Britain maintain control of the teiritoiy. Hong Kong was a place of stability and 
financial success on China’s doorstep during a tumultuous period in the Mainland’s 
history. Throughout this time Hong Kong served as an entrepot for China’s trade and 
facilitated economic transactions between China and the rest of the world. Because 
this relationship worked well; it was not until 1979 that Hong Kong’s sovereignty 
became an issue between Britain and China. In the late 1970s the British governor in 
Hong Kong, Sir Murray MacLehose, appreciated he had a unique problem on his 
hands. New terms for the leases for government lands and properties in the New 
Territories that were due up for renewal in the next few years would extend beyond 
1997. However, with the British lease of the New Territories ending in 1997, the 
British government in Hong Kong potentially would not have the authority to approve 
new leases. Britain, concerned for the extension of leases and the question of whether 
or not banks would lend for mortgages overlapping the 1997 deadline, felt it was 
necessary to be certain of Hong Kong’s post-1997 friture in order to assure investors.^ 
Britain was anxious to clarify the issue of sovereignty with China and was wary of 
continuing to govern the colony on the assumption that they would be able to do so 
ad infinitum.
The late 1970s presented the opportune moment from Britain’s point of view 
for raising the issue with China. China had literally begun to open its markets at the 
end of 1978 when the Central Committee of the Communist Party endorsed Deng 
Xiaoping’s (China’s de facto leader at the time) reforms for the Chinese economy, 
and Britain viewed this as a sign that China was at a point where they would be most 
receptive to discussing a beneficial resolution to the Hong Kong question. Sir Murray
' As the New Temtories are over 90% of tlie land area of tlie territory of Hong Kong and tlie various 
regions of tlie whole territory are well integrated, it would be virtually impossible for Britain to call 
into question the sovereignty of tlie New Territories witliout causing serious logistical problems for tlie 
remainder of tlie colony.
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consequently brought up the issue of the leases with Deng Xiaoping m a visit to 
Beijing in 1979, at which time he was told that China intended to take back Hong 
Kong, but would not do so before the 1997 deadline. Britain unwittingly conceded 
much of its bargaining position when it alluded to China that it was willing to discuss 
the future of Hong Kong at this time. With the opening of its economy, China was 
looking for support for its initiatives, and Hong Kong was a natural target for China’s 
outward look. China began to co-opt Hong Kong before talks with Britain had even 
begun: in 1978 China resumed direct flights with Hong Kong after thirty years, and 
the creation of the Shenzhen special economic zone (SEZ)^ directly across the border 
from Hong Kong meant that Shenzhen would be poised to take advantage of 
investment from its neighbour. China’s intentions at the time were reflected by a 
statement in 1978 by Li Qiang, China’s foreign trade minister, in which he claimed 
that China would ‘require tens of billions of dollars in foreign credits to support its 
modernisation programme, in which Hong Kong will play a part’. (Cottrell, 1993, 
39) China’s position on Hong Kong was clear: China wanted to use Hong Kong to 
strengthen its own economy, and once it Imew Britain was willing to negotiate, 
obtaining sovereignty became part of its plan.
Negotiations were initiated when the British understood that China was intent 
on taking back the territory. China and Britain both had vested interests in seeing the 
territory returned to China with all confidence and stability intact. China, although it 
had always regarded the treaties of the respective Opium Wars as one-sided and 
unequal, had never made overtures to reclaim the territory by force. It could have 
easily have done so, especially in the decade after World War II, or by simply cutting
 ^ Four coastal areas were designated as open economic zones in wliicli foreign investment was 
encouraged by means of special incentives and tax breaks. The creation of tliese zones is outlined 
furtlier in tlie next chapter.
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off Hong Kong’s water or food resources at any point. China realised the value in 
negotiating for a diplomatic settlement of Hong Kong, as it wanted to gain back Hong 
Kong in the same state as it currently operated in terms of its economic value to 
China. China was also ‘saving face’ by participating in a negotiated settlement and 
hoped to inspire investor confidence in China and Hong Kong. Britain was also 
motivated by a moral obligation to the people of Hong Kong: this was the first 
instance in which a British colony would not be given independence, but instead 
handed over to another authority, and a communist and autocratic one at that. Britain 
desired certainty for the benefit of fliture loans and investment in the territory. 
Britain’s main proposal was for continued British governance of the territory while 
sovereignty would be resumed by China, as the British perceived that this would be 
the best settlement for continued confidence in the territory’s economy. Britain had 
hoped that by raising the Hong Kong issue when it did, China’s own economic 
development and consequential need for Hong Kong’s economic status quo would 
reinforce the need for continuity in the form of British presence in the territory. Even 
before the opening of negotiations in 1983, China dismissed this proposal outright, 
and it wasn’t until Britain was willing to concede this point that China would come to 
the negotiating table. China not only wanted sovereignty, but political control as 
well. China wanted Hong Kong, in its future growth as a financial centre, to serve the 
Chinese economy, and Chinese control of the territory would help to ensure this:
Wliereas tlie British have tended to treat Hong Kong in a separate niche from tlie rest 
of its foreign policy, tlie Cliinese have tended to treat it a part of a much broader 
domestic and international canvass. ...Britaui’s interests are focused entirely on 
managing a smooth transfer of sovereignty that will preserve Hong Kong’s way of 
life and tliat will be acceptable to its people. The Cltinese autliorities are not only 
determined to re-establish sovereignty, tliey seek to do so in ways tliat will not lead 
to tlie subversion of theh politics, tliat will help tliem in tlie reunification witli 
Taiwan, and tliat will seive tlieir broad foreign policy goals in the Asia-Pacific, as 
well as in ways tliat will serve tlie economy. (Yaliuda, 1996, 94)
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Britain put much stock in a negotiated settlement, fearmi that China would act 
unilaterally on various issues of the repossession, and thus China had the upper hand 
throughout the negotiations. China formulated its plans for Hong Kong early on and 
indeed took many one-sided decisions about the territory: in late 1982, before serious 
negotiations had even begun, the head of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office in 
China announced that Hong Kong’s system would not be changed after the handover. 
The next month China’s NPC created a clause in the Chinese constitution that would 
allow for the creation of special administrative regions. Even during the course of 
negotiations China made public announcements as to their intentions for Hong Kong, 
although the negotiations were supposed to be confidential. In July 1983 China 
revealed that its plans for friture governance would allow Hong Kong to keep its 
capitalist system and that local people would participate in helping to form a new 
constitution for the territory. (Rafferty, 1989, 405) China espoused the theory of 
‘one country, two systems’, a concept which had earlier been developed by Deng 
Xiaoping in relation to Taiwan. China has continually sought since the Communist 
Revolution to integrate Taiwan into the PRC, and proposed ‘one country, two 
systems’ to the Taiwanese government as a way of furthering this goal. When Hong 
Kong became an issue, this concept was used as the bargaining linchpin of China, as 
their proposed mechanism to maintain confidence and business strength in Hong 
Kong. While resuming sovereignty of Hong Kong, China would allow the territory to 
operate as a Special Administrative Region, meaning Hong Kong could maintain its 
economic and political systems separate from those of the Mainland.
Despite its plans for the territory, China refused to allow Hong Kong to be a 
third party in the negotiations, claiming that the matter was purely between the 
Chinese and British governments. It was part of China’s policy of ‘maximising its
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freedom of action over Hong Kong and seeking to consolidate support against the 
UK’ and of its ‘desire to capitalise on the power which China holds over the future of 
Hong Kong’. (Bowers, 1995, 5) China exercised this power and underlined its 
interests in the friture path of Hong Kong’s economy through the arrangements for 
Hong Kong’s new airport. In 1983 discussions had begun in Hong Kong for the need 
of a new airport to replace Kai Tak, which was overburdened with increasing levels 
of air traffic to Hong Kong. The project was accelerated in 1988, but the airport 
would necessarily need the approval of China before banks would finance the project. 
The need for approval allowed China to gain greater consultation over pre-1997 
economic affairs: China objected when Jardine Matheson was awarded a contract to 
build container terminals for the new airport and subsequently delayed the project. 
(Yahuda, 1996, 67, and Bowers, 1995, 3) China was displeased that Jardines had de­
listed from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in March 1984 and moved its financial 
domicile to Bermuda. Through its consultations on the airport project, China took 
advantage of its role as friture master to influence the development of Hong Kong’s 
economic affairs.
Revenue from land leases were another issue in which China sought to secure 
the prosperity of Hong Kong’s post-1997 economy. Motivated by a concern that 
Britain would dry up Hong Kong government funds before 1997, China insisted upon 
an agreement by which a Land Fund was established in 1985. Half of the proceeds 
from the lease of land before July 1997 would be placed In the Fund, which would 
revert to the Hong Kong government’s coffers after the handover.
China was assertive in the negotiations; from its point of view, it was to be the 
future sovereign and had the right to establish political parameters for the territory in 
accordance with its own national laws. While China wanted Hong Kong to remain a
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successful financial centre, at die same time it wanted Hong Kong back on its own 
terms and was willing to sacrifice some stability to achieve this end. Reacting to 
tensions between Britain and China in the negotiations, the Hong Kong dollar fell to a 
record low in September 1983, but despite this China announced at the end of that 
September that they would take unilateral action on Hong Kong if a settlement was 
not reached by September 1984. Britain was confronted with either reaching an 
agreement with China on China’s tenus or having no agreement at all; thus Britain 
agreed to have no official role in Hong Kong after the handover, the main sticking 
point in negotiations at that time. (Chiu, 1987, 9) After the twenty-second round of 
formal talks, Britain and China initialled the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 
September 1984: this was the guiding treaty by which Hong Kong was handed back 
to China and which allowed for British governance of the territory until midnight 30 
June 1997.
In accordance with the terms of the Joint Declaration, which is recognised as 
an international treaty, China formed a constitution which establishes Hong Kong as a 
Special Administrative Region (HKS AR) of the PRC. The Basic Law, as it is known, 
was approved by the NPC on 4 April 1990. Under the Basic Law, the HKSAR is 
guaranteed ‘a high degree of autonomy’ and that the ‘previous capitalist system and 
way of life shall remain unchanged’ for fifty years after the handover. (Basic Law, 
Articles 5 and 2) Article 109 of the Basic Law is most revealing, however, in 
explaining the terms under which China expects Hong Kong to operate, requiring that 
the HKSAR government ‘provide an appropriate economic and legal environment for 
the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre’. The 
Basic Law was constructed partially with a view to securing investor confidence in 
the fliture of Hong Kong by providing assurances and therefore removing some
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uncertainty about the territory’s future under Chinese rule. With the written 
guarantees of a separate government and financial system and the maintenance of the 
status quo, investors would tend to feel more confident in continuing their market 
activities in the territory as opposed to if there were no such guarantees at all. While 
in Hong Kong many members of the business community whom I interviewed 
pointed to the Basic Law as a reason for retaining confidence in the territory. China 
therefore seems set to continue to reap the benefits of investor activity in the territory.
Hong Kong’s business government
In the pre-handover deliberations China made a number of decisions which 
established the precedent of China’s right as sovereign to influence the makeup of the 
Hong Kong government. China wants Hong Kong to remain a business-orientated 
territory, where politics come a distant second. A government with a powerful 
executive, the type of government Hong Kong has had for most of its modem 
existence, is conducive to placing business over politics. Therefore, China would like 
to see this type of government maintained in the territory, in order to reduce the threat 
of political subversion to the Communist regime and to emphasize the economic role 
the territory plays. In pursuit of a strong top-down, executive-led government, the 
Communist regime in Beijing aligned itself with business interests in Hong Kong to 
consolidate its position within the territoiy. Although contradictory on the surface, 
for the Communist government to work in conjunction with capitalists is a means to 
an end. The ‘end’ is forming a business-minded government in Hong Kong 
sympathetic (or at least, non-subversive) to China. China has a long-standing policy 
of creating alliances with groups it is ideologically at odds with, in order to ‘build 
popular support’ or flirther a common goal. (Allen, 1997, 68) Later, it may sever
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these ties when they cease to seiwe any useful purpose. This policy of ‘seeking to co- 
opt as wide a range of interests as possible’ is referred to as forming a united front. 
(Bowers, 1995, 4) For example, the communists formed a united front with the 
nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-chek to fight the invading Japanese forces in the 
1930s. The Communist government in Beijing has worked for an executive-led 
government in Hong Kong which will accentuate Hong Kong’s economic role and 
minimise its political nature. This is also what certain business interests would like, 
as they see an executive-led government conducive to stability, which provides for an 
environment in which business can flourish. It is because of this common objective 
of the primacy of economics over politics that Beijing has aligned itself with 
capitalist business interests to gain support within the territory for this initiative. 
Hence, in order to bring businesspeople into its camp, China gave a number of 
important official positions to businesspeople, naming them Hong Kong Affairs 
Advisers in which capacity they would be responsible for advising China on local 
issues. China also appointed businesspeople to the various committees created to 
handle issues of the handover, specifically the Preparatory Committee which had the 
responsibility, amongst others, to review Hong Kong’s laws and make 
recommendations to bring them in line with the Basic Law. In the beginning of 1997, 
the Committee proposed that 25 Hong Kong laws be rewritten or eliminated, 
including some relating to the territory’s Bill of Rights, the territory’s outline of 
certain fundamental rights guaranteed to its citizens.
Observations have been made as to the unlikely partnership that has been 
created between the capitalist businesspeople, many who had family that fled 
communist China, and the present Communist regime in Beijing; ‘there seems to be 
an unholy alliance among the Communists, the capitalists, and the high-ranking
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bureaucrats who are likely Lo insist on an executive-centered and performance- 
oriented constitution. ’ (Kuan and Lau, 1987, 112) Successful capitalists have done 
well in Hong Kong in the past fifty years partially due to little or no government 
influence in economic affairs, and like Beijing, they believe a stable environment for 
business takes precedence over political concerns. Furthermore, they see that it 
makes good business sense to form alliances with China, the new master of the 
territory and Hong Kong’s economic hinterland.
The Preparatory Committee, the body which was to attend to the logistics of 
the handover, consisted of Chinese and Hong Kong residents appointed by the 
Beijing government. The Preparatory Committee was in charge of appointing a 
Selection Committee that was responsible for electing the Provisional Legislature and 
the new Chief Executive of Hong Kong. The Selection Committee consisted of 400 
members, all of whom were from Hong Kong, 70 of whom were members of the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, In December 1996 this committee voted Tung Chee 
Hwa, a business executive with links to the West and ties with Beijing, as the new 
Chief Executive.^ Of the final three candidates, Tung had the strongest business 
credentials and had prior business dealings with China tlirough a shipping company 
he used to own. Under his ownership the business suffered bankinptcy and was 
bailed out by a consortium of investors backed by China. As a businessman, Tung 
has consistently emphasised the need for stability during his tenure as Chief 
Executive and has underlined that economic strength is paramount to political reform 
in the territory. Tung appointed many businesspeople to the Executive Council 
(ExecCo), his body of advisors. Five of these advisors served on the Preparatory
 ^ The new title, replacing tliat of Governor, of tlie head of the Hong Kong SAR government, is 
indicative of tlie manner in which tlie temtoiy is to be run.
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Committee, and thi'ee are also members of the Provisional Legislature. (Ridding, 
Financial Times, 25 January 1997)
The Provisional Legislature took over from the existing, partially elected 
legislature following the handover. Democratically elected seats were first 
introduced into the Legislative Council (LegCo), Hong Kong’s law-making body, in 
1991, but under the arrangements only 20% of the seats were directly elected by the 
general population. The British and the Chinese were to agree on a ‘tlirough-train’ 
legislature with a portion of directly elected seats that was to be elected in 1995 and 
sit through the transition to the end of its term. However, China was surprised and 
displeased with the announcements of Chris Patten in 1992 that he planned to push 
through reforms which would extend the franchise of LegCo. He guided his 
proposals through LegCo, without consultation or negotiations with the Chinese, as 
had been the case with all other proposed government changes since negotiations had 
begun. This was a unilateral move by the British, and consequently the Chinese 
reacted by claiming that they would dissolve the 1995 legislature with the changes as 
Cliris Patten had implemented, and form their own legislature for Hong Kong which 
would take its place immediately after the handover. Hong Kong’s post-1997 form of 
government was decided by China and not Hong Kong itself: ‘(w)hile the British 
appear to have succeeded in decolonizing some aspects of Hong Kong’s polity. 
Mainland Chinese officials seem to be determined to recolonize it.’ (Hing, 1995, 
266) In December 1996 the Selection Committee elected the Provisional Legislature, 
in which strong business and pro-China interests received a large number of seats. 
More than half of the members of the pre-handover legislature were appointed to be 
members of the Provisional Legislature, and this was the cause of some considerable 
discussion as to conflict of interest. Furthermore, only nine members of the
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Provisional Legislature were not members of the Selection Committee. The makeup 
of the legislature is further proof of China’s intentions to frame the government to be 
sympathetic to business concerns: the largest groups in the Provisional Legislature 
are the pro-China Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong and the pro­
business Liberal Party. At the time Beijing claimed the Provisional Legislature was a 
temporary measure until the mechanism for elections could be set up for a new 
legislature that would be formed in the year or two after the handover. These 
arrangements were made in early 1998 and elections were conducted in May 1998, 
but only 20 out of 60 seats were elected by the population at large in a proportional 
representation system. The Provisional Legislature will stay in power until the new 
legislature takes up proceedings in May 1999.
Conclusion
This chapter explored the terms under which China regained sovereignty of 
Hong Kong. Much as the reasons were economic for China losing the territory in the 
1800s, China’s interest in having Hong Kong returned was economically motivated. 
China had definite ideas of the form in which it wanted Hong Kong to be handed 
back and the subsequent role it should play in China’s own development. It adhered 
to these principles throughout the negotiations and as a result it is currently benefiting 
from having a financial centre under its auspices. China’s intentions for Hong Kong 
ascertained via announcements made prior to and during the negotiations were made 
manifest with the signing of the Joint Declaration, and China seems to have acquired 
everything it set out to gain. Hong Kong was handed back to China midnight 30 June 
1997 in a ceremony which emphasised the pride China felt at regaining the territory. 
In a visit a few months later, it was clear that Hong Kong was continuing with the
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status- quo, and many people were quick to point out how well the policy of ‘one 
country, two systems’ was working. The policy underlines that China would like to 
be able to use the capitalist financial and trading centre while keeping it separate fi*om 
its own socialist ideology. Hong Kong is first and foremost a business centre, and 
China will work to ensure that this remains the case. Hong Kong is crucial for 
encouraging China’s growth, and this ‘economic mission of Hong Kong... require[s] 
the Chinese government to retain the ultimate control over the direction Hong Kong 
is taking in terms of “one country, two systems’” . (Kuan and Lau, 1987, 105-106) 
China is heavily dependent upon Hong Kong as the window to the global economy, 
and Hong Kong’s service in this capacity is explored in the following chapters. 
Because Hong Kong is an important part of China’s economy, China wanted to 
internalise the territory in order to create and formalise a closer working relationship 
with the Hong Kong decision-makers as well as the territory as a whole. The 
dichotomy of reuniting Hong Kong with the Mainland but simultaneously keeping it 
separate, semi-autonomous entity allows China to use the enclave’s economy in its 
current, successfiil incarnation, that of an international capitalist market while 
sidestepping the issue of reconciling the vastly different systems.
In this chapter I have explained the manner in which China gained control of 
Hong Kong, and in the process I have touched on the reasons why China would want 
ultimate authority of the territoiy. As a developing country, China requires large 
amounts of foreign capital to fund its growth, and Hong Kong is the arena in which to 
obtain the majority of this needed investment. Control of the territory means that 
China is able to guarantee, through certain powers of the state such as approving the 
selection of Chief Executive, that Hong Kong continues to operate as a financial city. 
China desired the closer relationship which sovereignty accords because then China
feit it could exercise some legitimate element of control in Hong Kong. This control 
was brought to bear in the formation of Hong Kong’s post-1997 government. China, 
of course, would not take any actions toward Hong Kong that it felt it could not 
justify through the Basic Law for fear of scaring off investors; China will always be 
conscious of the level of power it is able to exercise without jeopardising foreign 
investment in the tenitory. China wanted to utilise Hong Kong for its development 
through a more integrated relationship of sovereignty over the territory. It is 
important, therefore, to examine why China is dependent upon Hong Kong to 
contribute to its growth before we undertake an analysis of how Hong Kong serves 
the Chinese economy. Particular development problems within China mean that 
China itself is unable to develop an international financial centre in the near future so 
that consequently it will continue to rely upon Hong Kong for financing and 
investment. China’s economy is outlined in the next chapter in order to evidence 
China’s development needs as well as to show the direction in which the nation’s 
leaders are guiding China’s growth.
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III. China's econom y and the need for capital
China embarked on a series of economic reforms in 1978, as a result of which 
the economy was opened to outside investment. As a developing country with the 
largest population in the world, China needs large amounts of capital to drive the 
engine of economic growth. The economic reforms have hurtled along at a breakneck 
pace in the past twenty years, often without the benefit of official authority or legal 
backing but resulting in double-digit national growth rates in the early half of the 
1990s. The modernisation of China’s economy will ultimately require the overhaul 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are at the centre of China’s development 
problems. The Communist government relies on massive growth in the economy to 
maintain stability and to justify its power. Subsequently, China is dependent to a 
large extent on foreign investment and trade to sustain expansion and modernisation 
of the national economy.
The chapter begins with a brief look at the initial reforms which set China on 
its path of phenomenal growth. The reforms that have consequently formed the basis 
of China’s development are explained thereafter; these have included devolution of 
power from the centre to the provinces. China modernisation agenda is far from 
being completed, however. China’s currency, the renminbi, is not yet fully 
convertible, and its three stock markets are ill equipped to serve the funding needs of 
the nation’s companies. As a result, China will continue to require the experience and 
assistance of Hong Kong’s financial markets to contribute to the nation’s 
development for the foreseeable future. To set the groundwork for an analysis of the 
way in which Hong Kong is expected to aid China’s growth, the following will detail 
the particular needs of the Chinese economy.
Background
Deng Xiaoping, China’s de facto leader up until his death in February 1997, 
instituted a process of market reforms which opened up the Mainland economy 
beginning in 1978. The Communist Party leaders realised that in order to become a 
major player in the global economy, China would need to open its economy to 
foreign trade and investment. Before 1978, China relied heavily on a policy of self- 
sufficiency, in which the nation sought to provide for its needs and to become 
industrialised through its own means. This policy became harder to maintain, 
however, as China realised it required external capital to finance industrial projects 
and foreign trade to expand its economy;
Hie Cliinese ruling elite appreciated tliat a command economy, based on state owned 
industrial enteiprises and collective coimnunes, was incapable of providing 
satisfactory growth, e.g. to become a leading international power. Deng’s 
justification for pusliing reforms in tlie late 1970’s was to enable Cliina to catch up 
witli tlie otlier major powers. Tlie problem was perceived as how to move towards a 
more vibrant and decentralised (market) economy witliout weakening tlie political 
supremacy of tlie Party. (Goodhart and Xu, 1996, 59, emphasis added)
The reforms included the establishment of four Special Economic Zones (SEZs),
export-processing areas created to encourage foreign investment in China’s
manufacturing sector. The SEZs were meant to be an experiment isolated from the
rest of the Mainland, which tested the principles of interacting with the international
economy. Because of their contained nature, SEZs allowed the government to control
the activities of foreign investors. Various incentives were offered to businesses to
locate in the SEZs: these included the relative independence to hire and fire workers
and the setting of wages; a lower profit tax rate of 15% compared with about 33% in
the rest of the countiy at the time; exemption from profit tax on profits reinvested in
the SEZs for five years or longer; reduced prices for China-made products and raw
materials; and the ability to repatriate any profits. Beijing recently announced that it
would reinstate the incentives which liad been rescinded by the central government in 
1997 which allowed foreign firms to import raw materials and equipment without 
paying customs duties. From the beginning it was investors from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan who primarily took advantage of the opportunities in these areas and 
transferred their manufacturing industries to the SEZs. The creation of the four SEZs 
along the Mainland coast followed patterns of investment already established by 
Taiwan and Hong Kong which had been channelling funds to businesses or family 
members on the Mainland before the implementation of reforms: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
and Shantou are all in Guangdong Province which borders Hong Kong, and the 
fourth, Xiamen in Fujian Province, was set up across the strait from Taiwan. China 
was obviously attempting to exploit the excess investment capital in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. The Shenzhen SEZ alone had US$2.42 billion in foreign investment in 
1996, up 40% from 1995. {Wall Sti^eet Journal, 14 January 1997) Guangdong 
Province accounted for about one-third of China’s total foreign investment in 1996. 
{Wall Street Journal, 14 January 1997) Major investment and infrastructure projects 
in the areas around the SEZs have meant that the economic investment has expanded 
beyond the SEZ borders. In fact, many of the special privileges associated with 
investment in SEZs have slowly been phased out by the central government so that 
investment is encouraged to develop beyond these areas. One of the modern 
dilemmas of China, however, is to open its economy while trying to contain the 
influence of ideas and capitalist mechanisms it deems subversive to its central 
control.
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Chinese federalism
The development of a loose form of federalism in China has guaranteed 
economic reforms to some extent. Chinese federalism has developed as power has 
devolved from the central government to the provinces as a result of trade and 
investment patterns, not tlirough any directive of the central government. Tliis 
‘market-preserving federalism’ provides some insurance as to the irreversibility of the 
economic reforms thus far: the current growth pattern has proved too important to 
keep the current government in power and is necessary for internal and regional 
stability. The coastal regions have an important leverage over the central government 
in that their economic success is essential for legitimising Communist Party power. 
The natural economic zone that encompasses Hong Kong is the most important of 
these r eg ions . Hong  Kong’s unique status as a Special Administrative Region 
encourages this federalism, and in turn the devolution of power from the centre will 
benefit Hong Kong in its every day conduct as a separate entity from the Mainland. 
However, Chinese federalism has its down side in that it jeopardises China’s unity. 
International trade promises made by the central government may not hold much 
weight considering that its power is undermined by the devolution of authority and 
that it has difficulty commanding the trading and manufacturing industries within 
some of the provinces. Many of the provinces have their own regulations for trade 
and investment and some have set up trade barriers amongst themselves, resulting in 
inter-China protectionism. A huge segment of government revenue and business 
activity is controlled at the provincial level, and therefore foreign companies often 
bargain with the provincial governments directly regarding investment opportunities. 
Provinces controlled 68% of foreign direct investment in 1992. (Montinola, 1995,
62) Despite the fact that power could be concentrated in the hands Beijing’s policy 
makers, it would perhaps be in the world trading regime’s interest for China to have a 
strong central government, so that regulations agreed in international forums would 
be substantiated with the understanding that they would be able to be effectively 
enforced throughout China.
Economic growth
China’s growth since reform began in 1978 has been nothing short of 
spectacular. In 1992 GNP growth, which includes the product of Chinese companies 
abroad, was 13.6%, in 1993 it was 13.4%, in 1994 it was 11.8%. (Faison, New York 
Times, 2 January 1996) In 1995 GDP growth was 10.2%, and in 1996 it grew by 
9.7%, reaching a level of almost US$508 billion, although it was the first time since 
1991 that the economy grew less than 10% annually according to China’s State 
Statistics Bureau. {New York Times, 31 December 1996) However, this slower 
growth also helped to slow inflation in the national economy, which is one of the 
priorities of the central government. Inflation in 1996 was 6%, down from 14.8% in 
1995 and 21.7% in 1994. {New York Times, 31 December 1996)
In order to improve the quality of life for the 1.2 billion population and 
therefore validate its own rule, China continually seeks to attract foreign investment, 
improve its infrastructure, and secure the supply of vital resources. To acquire raw 
materials China has asserted itself in contested areas that are expected to contain 
natural resources. A massive coal-mining project is planned for Inner Mongolia, 
which is estimated to cost US$5 billion. China is also participating in oil drilling
The natural economic zone Imown as Greater China comprises Hong Kong, Guangdong Province in 
soutliem Cliina, and Taiwan. The attributes of tlie economic reiationsliip of tliis aiea are disclosed in 
Chapter 5.
projects in the western interior and in the South China Sea. If China is unable to 
increase its own supply of oil and therefore pushes up demand in foreign markets, 
especially the Middle East, then there is a real possibility for an oil shock if these 
producers are not prepared to meet the demand. When China’s NPC approved the 
Ninth Five-Year Economic Plan in March 1996, it approved a number of 
infrastructure projects. A number of these projects are extremely ambitious, and the 
World Bank estimates that the total investment requirements will be between US$280 
billion and US$370 billion. {Financial Times, 19 March 1996) While most of this 
investment will come internally from China, 15-20% of the funds will need to be 
drawn from foreign resources. {Financial Times, 19 March 1996) Yet China’s own 
spending on infrastructure is constrained by the government’s efforts to keep inflation 
under control. Of the largest projects, the Three Gorges Dam is probably the most 
controversial. Plans are to build the largest dam in the world on the Yangtze River 
below the scenic Three Gorges, Besides ruining many sites of significant historical 
interest, the plan will also force thousands of people to relocate and will cause 
numerous ecological problems. Other infrastructure projects include a north-south 
coastal rail and highway system, telecommunications systems which are earmarked to 
receive US$60 billion, and ports, which will require US$10 billion. {Financial 
Times, 19 March 1996)
Foreign investment
What will confirm China as an economic superpower is ultimately what will 
serve as a leverage on other countries. China’s huge population is a lucrative market 
to be exploited in the eyes of foreign companies. So eager are companies to access 
this market that Beijing holds a powerful bargaining tool. The Chinese government’s
power vis-à-vis other countries derives from its role as gatekeeper to the massive, 
evolving market of middle-class consumers. Several countries compete for 
investment opportunities in China, thus if one country imposes restrictions on trade 
with China, China can turn elsewhere to supply its trading and capital needs. China’s 
market pull enables it to play countries off of one another; this has led to the 
conclusion that ‘the West will not be able to maintain a common front’ in their 
eagerness to enter the Chinese market. (Cable and Ferdinand, 1994, 256) This 
leverage, however, is checked by the interdependence of the East Asia region and the 
global economy as a whole. Because of the large amounts of trade in the region and 
the reliance China has on foreign investment, it is important not to jeopardise these 
relationships. Over the past four years foreign companies have invested more than 
US$340 billion in China, more than 70% of which came from Asian companies. 
(Sugawara, Washington Post, 18 March 1996) In 1995 China received the most 
foreign direct investment (FDI) of any developing country with US$38 billion. {The 
Economist, 16 March 1996) This figure increased to US$40 billion in 1996. 
(Brauchli, Wall Street Journal, 14 January 1997) Foreign investment is allowed in 
virtually every sector now, excepting a few key sectors such as energy.
China, as well as presenting market opportunities, is also a source of 
competition to trading partners. China has developed a large manufacturing base as 
many manufacturing operations locate in China seeking low-cost labour; nearly 80% 
of overseas investment was in the manufacturing sector. (Wall Street Journal, 14 
January 1997) Of China’s exports in 1992, 80% were labour-intensive manufactures. 
(Cable and Ferdinand, 1994, 246) These manufacturing industries, as they produce 
higher quality goods and operate more efficiently, are already competitors to 
manufacturing bases in other East Asian nations, as well as those located in
industrialised nations. However, China has many issues with which to contend before 
it reaches its full potential in manufacturing capabilities. China’s industrial plant 
inffastaicture is antiquated, yet major renovations will be a huge undertaking. It is 
estimated that only 20 to 25% of equipment in industrial enterprises are as recent as 
the 1970’s and 80’s. (Simon, 1991, 23) Furthermore, at the caix of global 
competition today is the ability to respond swiftly to customers’ needs, and this 
oftentimes means forming strategy and organising production on a global basis. At 
the present time, there are no state-owned Chinese companies, perhaps with the 
exception of CITIC,^ which are in the position to operate at a truly global level: most 
state-owned companies are not able to take advantage of new market opportunities 
because they are burdened with debt and superfluous employees.
China presently lags behind in the development of modern, higher value- 
added manufacturing and high-technology industries such as software and 
information technology. Significantly, ‘China has yet to achieve the required type 
and level of strategic assets to play a significant role in the competition among key 
national and corporate actors in the international marketplace. China remains aloof 
from the mainstream of global competition in most industries, particularly in 
information intensive fields...’ (Simon, 1991, 12) Included amongst these 
information intensive industries is the banking sector, and until the mechanisms are 
developed to support this industry, China continues to be dependent upon Hong Kong 
for advanced financial services. While it will be able initially to base its growth on 
the large-scale, low-cost manufacturing sector, China will undoubtedly seek to 
develop technologically advanced enterprises in order to increase its competitiveness 
in the world economic scene. It is certainly attempting to develop this industry
Tliis Cliinese company, amongst otliers, is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
through its own indigenous companies, some of which have expanded into Hong 
Kong for the purpose of acquiring the latest technology. The U S. maintains export 
controls on advanced technology to China, primarily to prevent the technology from 
being applied to weapons systems, and thus Chinese companies have set up in Hong 
Kong in order to bypass these restrictions. (Fung, 1997, 93) The U.S., Japan, and EU 
nations will, for the long-term, continue to be the leaders in advanced technology, 
especially because these countries have the legal environment as well as the research 
and development budgets to maintain leadership position in this industry.
Chinese economic development is undermined by the fact that many of the 
reforms have not been cemented with the rule of law, which leaves an uncertain 
future for the direction and pace of Chinese economic reform. Investments are not 
protected by standardised, legal investment regulations, and therefore investment in 
China is often a risky venture: ‘there have been few attempts to provide the central 
feature of private markets, a system of secure private-property rights. Nor has an 
attempt been made to develop a commercial law...or an independent court system for 
adjudication.’ (Montinola, 1995, 50) However, Chinese development continues at a 
rapid pace despite the lack of support of a legal framework. Hong Kong and Taiwan 
investors are the driving forces behind much of this growth, as they see tremendous 
investment opportunities in their economic hinterland. Whether or not they are better 
equipped than western investors to do business ‘Chinese style’ is explored in the next 
chapter.
The dearth of technical and legal infrastructure will hold China back for 
awhile: a major point of contention in the international trading community is China’s 
inadequate legal provisions and enforcement of regulations for copyrighting and 
intellectual property. Foreign businesses are reluctant to locate base operations in
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China because of the poor infrastructure as weli as the lack of a clear, fair legal 
framework. When coupled with the uncertainties of Chinese political future and 
bureaucratic red tape, ‘it will clearly be some time before major MNCs [multi­
national corporations] call on significant portions of the Chinese economy to assist 
with their effort to enhance competitiveness.’ (Simon, 1991, 24) Other factors 
hindering foreign investment in China include lack of currency convertibility on the 
capital account, the length of time it takes to realise profits after initially investing in 
China, and the problems of enforcing contracts due to the lack of legal backing.®
Trade
Until 1990, because foreign exchange holdings and the capital account 
balance were small, the government kept imports roughly even with exports. 
However, foreign exchange reserves went from US$19.4 billion at the end of 1992 to 
US$69.8 billion in October 1995. (Goodhart and Xu, 1996, 74) Exports and imports 
have grown at more or less the same rate throughout the reform period, and so there 
has been no persistent trend in the balance of trade. About 80% of the country’s total 
foreign trade is with the Asia-Pacific region. (Taylor, 1994, 266) China’s exports 
totalled US$151 billion in 1996, increasing thirty times in twenty years. (Faison, New 
York Times, 4 March 1997)
Through the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APEC), the only such trade 
forum of which China is a member, China has announced ftirther plans to liberalise 
trade. Some of its planned reforms include a 30% cut in tariffs, elimination of a 
number of import quotas and controls, and easing of restrictions on operations of joint 
ventures. (Goodhart and Xu, 1996, 76) With the implementation of these reforms
 ^For discussions on tlie problems of bureaucracy hindering business and tlie difficulty in realising 
profits in Cliina, see tlie automobile industry example in Kiistof and WiiDmm, 1994.
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China aims to become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It is contended by 
member countries of the WTO, the U.S. in particular, that China must make more 
concessions before it is granted membership. Hong Kong, on the other hand, is a full 
member of APEC and the WTO and is permitted by China to maintain separate 
relations with these organisations. China still engages in a wide variety of 
protectionist measures, in part to shield state-owned enterprises (SOEs). China 
believes it should be allowed more time to meet WTO criteria, as it asserts it is a 
developing country and therefore must address domestic growth before completely 
liberalising trade. Import tariffs average 30%, thus to access China’s market, 
companies are virtually compelled to build factories on the Mainland. The 
government demands that foreign companies share their technological expertise as a 
requirement for locating operations in China. Foreign-owned companies are also 
required to export a certain percentage of their output and are only allowed to ship 
goods overseas through Chinese trading companies. The U.S. believes China has 
shown little commitment to improving on some of the more basic of the concerns the 
U.S. has regarding free trade with China, including personal property rights and 
copyrighting and piracy laws. This is seen in the ongoing debates between the U.S. 
and China over pirating of compact discs and software. U.S. compact disc 
manufacturers have estimated their loss to China over pirated CD’s and software to 
be over US$866 million. (Mufson, Washington Post, 18 February 1996)
Reform of State-Owned Enterprises
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China cover a broad range, from the 
cumbersome and bankaipt to the successflil conglomerates. Chinese companies listed
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on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEEK), H-shares and led chips, are the more 
viable and prosperous of the SOEs, although they share certain traits with the stagnant 
and debt-ridden state industries which are propped up by the central government. 
Many state industries are heavily subsidised and receive unlimited ‘loans’ from the 
state banks. Because of the lack of incentive and lack of a hard budget constraint, 
many SOEs record losses year after year. The government, however, continues to 
feed the SOEs direct subsidies; in 1994 subsidies to loss-making enterprises totalled 
36.62 billion yuan, which was 7.02% of government fiscal revenue. (Goodhart and 
Xu, 1996, 69) In 1996 45% of SOEs recorded losses, which totalled US$8.3 billion, 
an amount 45% greater than in 1995. {New York Times, 31 December 1996) China 
continues to fund these industries because of the social safety net they provide. 
Under the old Communist system, the work unit, or danwei, was responsible for 
providing employees’ housing, health care, family’s education, and retirement 
benefit. SOEs are still responsible for providing for many of these needs, thus the 
central government is reluctant to allow these companies to fail for fear of the mass 
unemployment and welfare black hole it would create. If the SOEs are allowed to go 
out of business, mass unemployment would predictably lead to labour unrest, 
threatening the power of the central government. Of the more than 100 million 
employees of SOEs, it is estimated that a quarter of these are surplus workers. 
(Mufson, Washington Post, 13 September 1997) However, the government also 
realises that it is necessary to reform SOEs in order to modernise the economy, to 
control inflation, to reform the banking system, and to perpetuate growth at a level 
which would maintain stability. The Communist Party realises that the raising of 
living standards and perpetuation of economic growth lends legitimacy to the 
government. Thus during the 15th National Party Conference, in October 1997,
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President Jiang Zemin announced that reform of the SOEs would be a priority over 
the next few years. The reform plan allows for the selling of the medium and small 
SOEs, and the ‘privatisation’ (although that term is not used) of SOEs tlirough the 
selling of shares to employees. More large enterprises will be allowed to issue stocks 
and bonds to raise funds, and the debt of certain SOEs will become special holdings 
owned by the state. In addition, mergers are to be made easier, and some bankrupt 
SOEs will be allowed to fail. This announcement was given more credence with the 
appointment of Zhu Rongji as the new Premier. As the former finance minister, Zhu 
is seen by many as a moderate and a pragmatist, and he has proven in the past that he 
is able to take the necessary steps to prudently manage the Chinese economy. He has 
kept inflation low despite high growth rates. Realistically, however, many doubt that 
the government will be able to ‘privatise’ these industries without causing mass 
unemployment.
What has saved China, though, from being completely undermined by the 
inefficient SOEs is the diminishing role they are playing in the national economy. 
The state-owned sector of the economy is half as large as it was in 1980. (Mufson, 
Washington Post, 13 September 1997) Jobs created by foreign direct investment will 
be instrumental in moving people out of the state sector, which means that private 
investment will continue to need to be encouraged from places such as Hong Kong. 
Foreign companies as well as indigenous entrepreneurs who are starting and running 
successful businesses are helping to fill the economic gap left by SOEs. Increasingly, 
it is private companies which are taking over from township village enterprises 
(TVEs), rural enterprises run and managed by community collectives, as the sector 
fuelling growth in the economy. According to Figure 1, private enterprises now 
account for 25% of the product of enterprises on the Mainland (private businesses +
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share holding enterprises) Although SOEs still account for 41% of output, collective 
enterprises (TVEs) and domestic share-holding enterprises together account for 
almost as much output (39%). Hong Kong’s crucial role in investing on the 
Mainland, especially by facilitating economic relations between Taiwan and the 
Mainland, is also illustrated by Figure 1, which reveals that enterprises funded by 
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan contribute 10% of the output of companies operating 
on the Mainland, equally as much as that produced by all other foreign-funded 
enterprises together.
China's industrial output by enterprise type
Private enterprises funded 
from all other foreign sources 
10%
Private enterprises funded 
from Hong Kong. Taiwan, 
and Macao 
10%
Share holding enterprises 
5%
Figure 1
Source o f data: China Statistical Yearbook 1996
By the end of 1997, registered private companies numbered 960,000 and 
employed 39 million people, about a third as many as the SOEs. (Mufson, 
Washington Post, 12 April 1998) Companies with foreign investment produced 40% 
of exports in 1996, up from just 1% in 1985. (Faison, New York Times, 4 March
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1997) TVEs initially began to supplant SOEs in the national economy in the early 
1980s. In 1980 state enterprises produced 76.1% of China’s industrial output, while 
the collectives produced 23.5%. In 1994, however, the state enterprises only 
produced 34.1% of China’s industrial output, and the TVEs produced 40.9%. 
(Goodhart and Xu, 1996, 60) The breakdown of types of enterprises operating in 
China is given in Table 1; TVEs outnumber SOEs almost 14 to 1, although SOEs tend 
to be massive enterprises, many times the size of TVEs in terms of number of 
employees.
Table 1
Industrial enterprises, 1996
State-owned enterprises 114,000
Collectives 1,592,000
‘Individual’ enterprises 6,200,000
Others (includes joint ventures) 70,000
TOTAL 7,976,000
Source: Presentation by Jamie Allen, AMCHAMForum, Hong Kong, October 1997.
Local management of business in the form of TVEs help to soak up surplus rural 
labour, and because these companies are locally controlled, the owners have more 
incentive to improve productivity and thus increase profits. Local governments via 
TVEs are encouraged to compete with one another as well as try their own 
approaches to speed up growth. (Goodhart and Xu, 1996, 65) Local control also 
allows experimentation to the area economy without widespread effects on the 
national economy.
The competition and commerce between the TVEs and private enterprises 
have continued to boost market forces. Why has the government allowed privately 
owned companies and TVEs to proliferate without central government control? 
Simply, they have become so important for the growth of China that the state could
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not close these firms with out suffering economic disaster and undermining its 
political power by alienating those who mn and are employed by these businesses. 
Furthermore, local officials will work to protect the TVEs because of the money 
which they malce from them. These companies also provide a valuable source of 
employment for surplus agricultural workers, although they have not been able to 
create employment for all of the redundant rural labourers; approximately 130 million 
people have immigrated to urban areas seeking employment. (Cable and Ferdinand, 
1994, 251) Huge instability can be caused with such surplus labour movements, and 
the central government seeks to discourage urban migration, increasingly turning to 
the TVEs and private businesses to provide jobs. This migration is problematic for 
the provincial governments as well, who have even gone so far as to restrict the 
movements of people across provincial borders.
China’s stock markets
China’s stock markets are an experiment in market economy. Beginning in 
1985 some companies began issuing their own bonds to the public. Because of the 
stringent requirements for listing on China’s stock exchanges, most companies raise 
money through bonds rather than stocks. (Overholt, 1993, 108) In 1984 seven state 
enterprises in Shanghai were permitted by the authorities to issue shares to the public, 
and in 1986 the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China set up a share-trading 
counter. (Overholt, 1993, 107) In December 1990 share trading unofficially opened 
in Shenzhen, while Shanghai officially began trading at the same time. Shenzhen 
later received official recognition July 1991. (Overholt, 1993, 107) Today China has 
three formal stock markets, one each in Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Beijing.^ The
’ A detailed Mstoiy of tlie Shenzlien and Shanghai stock markets is expounded in Mookeijee and Yu, 
1995.
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Beijing stock maiket began listing companies in July 1992. These stock markets are 
regulated by China’s Securities Regulatory Commission, which itself is overseen by 
the securities committee of the Cabinet. Beijing tends to trade ‘legal person’ shares 
(shares owned by government bodies and SOEs), whereas Shanghai and Shenzhen 
trade ‘natural person’ shares (shares owned by individuals). (Overholt, 1993, 110) 
Although the markets were intended to be fairly similar, Shanghai has become the 
market for China’s large state enterprises, and Shenzhen is the exchange for smaller, 
entrepreneurial companies. (Overholt, 1993, 107) New share issues are typically 
oversubscribed many times, although the central government continues to limit the 
number of companies that are eligible to offer shares. Officials have also raised a tax 
on stock trading in an effort to control trading activity. The central government wants 
to move with caution in developing stock markets for ideological as well as practical 
reasons such as keeping inflation at a reasonable level.
Foreigners are limited in their permitted investment in the Chinese stock 
markets. There is a special group of shares which only foreigners are allowed to own, 
called B shares, and these shares are limited to a minority stake in the listed company. 
Because of the excessive demand in China for company stock, however, domestic 
buyers illegally purchase B shares, activity which the central government cracks 
down on every now and again, when inflation pressures on the economy are 
particularly acute. The first B shares were listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 
February 1992. B share issues require special approval from the Chinese central 
bank, and no investor is allowed to acquire more than 5% of a company without 
approval. Prices are quoted and purchases are settled in US$ in Shanghai or in HK$ 
in Shenzhen. (Overholt, 1993, 111)
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Although the restrictions on China’s stock market are aimed to help the 
government keep a tight reign on the nation’s capital markets, they also serve to 
hinder Chinese company expansion by limiting their fundraising capabilities. Besides 
government restrictions, trading activity on the stock markets is also limited by the 
lack of full currency convertibility. The Chinese government is wary of allowing its 
nascent markets to gi'ow unfettered for fear that inflation could spiral out of control. 
The Communist regime’s raison d'etre is also undermined by allowing a capitalist 
market mechanism such as share trading by the owners of capital lead the way to 
reform of the nation’s enterprises. For these reasons, Hong Kong’s financial markets 
are an important tool for Chinese company development because they are set apart, 
structurally and ideologically, from the Mainland’s own economic system.
China’s currency
As part of its economic reform, China began to revamp its foreign exchange 
systems in 1979. In 1992 Beijing opened the National Foreign Exchange Swap 
Centre, a computerised 60-seat market created with the ultimate aim of gaining a 
unified national renminbi market rate. (Overholt, 1993, 103) At the start of 1994 
China unified its official exchange rate with its swap market exchange rate. When 
the dual exchange rates were unified in 1994, China’s currency, the yuan (also known 
as the renminbi, or ‘people’s money’), was devalued by 33% against the dollar. As 
the official rate had been seen as too high, this unification meant that the official rate 
was depreciated to more closely resemble the swap rate. The unification to one 
floating exchange was a step towards flill currency convertibility. The yuan was 
made convertible at the end of November 1996 for current account transactions, 
covering trade-related activities, but it continues to be inconvertible in the capital
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account, which covers equity transactions and direct investme:rt activities. This is 
one of the reasons why China remained somewhat isolated from the East Asian 
economic crisis of 1997-1998, and consequently officials are in no hurry to make the 
yuan fully convertible. The yuan’s integrity has been maintained by large amounts of 
foreign investment and the fact that Chinese companies must remit their foreign 
currency earnings to the central bank. China had foreign exchange reserves totalling 
US$85 billion in 1996. {Financial Times, 21 June 1996) Reserves now total 
US$131.6 billion, one of the highest levels in the world. (Sanger, New York Times, 
23 September 1997) China needs to maintain high levels of foreign exchange 
reserves so that it can continue to import and pay off foreign debt. China has pledged 
to modernise its financial system, and according to Premier Zhu Rongji, who 
spearheads China’s economic reforms, this involves strengthening cuirency 
regulation by the central bank and promoting commercialisation of state-owned 
banks.
It wasn’t until the beginning of 1997 that foreign banks in China were allowed 
to deal in yuans. At the end of December 1996 four foreign banks were authorised to 
make loans, accept deposits, and carry out other transactions in the Chinese currency. 
These four banks. Citibank, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the Bank of Tokyo- 
Mitsubishi, and the Industrial Bank of Japan, are limited to yuan loans no greater than 
35% of their foreign-currency loans. The restrictions on dealing in yuans and the lack 
of full currency convertibility mean that Mainland Chinese cities are inhibited from 
developing the advanced financial markets which would pose any competition to 
Hong Kong.
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Cîîhia’s experience with the East Asian econcmic crisis
China was relatively insulated from the economic crisis that originated in East 
Asia in 1997. Two factors have protected China from the fate of some of its 
neighbours: one is the fact that a large portion of its exports is destined for non-Asian 
countries in which the demand remains strong. Secondly, the yuan is not fully 
convertible and thus not subject to the rollercoaster rides of currency markets. This is 
not to say that China has not exhibited some of the symptoms of the crisis. This 
includes excess capacity in the form of a tremendous number of new construction 
projects for buildings which may lie empty for lack of demand; according to one 
report, almost one quarter of the world’s building cranes is being utilised in Shanghai 
alone. (North, Washington Post, 3 August 1997) China is also fighting inflation and 
overheating of the economy, due in part to large amounts of foreign investment which 
flow in to the country. Bad loans to SOEs also undermine the strength of the 
economy and push up inflation, as explained above, and it is not quite clear if the 
government plans to restructure these loans or allow default; but in the process the 
government must be careflil that the banks themselves do not fail. With the 
appointment of Zhu Rongji as Premier, the government is signalling its understanding 
that austere measures will need to be taken to restrict liquidity. Zhu has worked to 
reign in inflation thi'ough tighter credit measures and has managed to keep inflation 
impressively low for the rapidly expanding economy. Tliroughout the depression in 
Asia, China has resisted pressure to devalue its currency. Were China to devalue the 
yuan, this would certainly put maximum pressure on Hong Kong to devalue the HK$, 
which China would be loathe to let happen.
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Conclusion
The reforms that China has undertaken has meant that China expanded its 
trade and investment links with the rest of the world, most notably tlirough the 
creation of the SEZs. The open door policy also has allowed Chinese investors to 
send capital to other parts of the world. China’s capital outflow was as large as 
US$30.5 billion in 1992. (Hornik, 1994, 34) China still has many development 
issues to address, primarily the reorganisation of the SOEs, before its economy can 
truly modernise. In the process it continues to require outside investment to fund 
business growth and create new jobs, and Hong Kong plays a crucial part in 
organising this investment. Hong Kong is China’s international financial centre, 
providing investment and project financing, and acting as an outlet for Mainland 
companies to interact with the global market. Chapter four will be an overview of the 
Hong Kong economy, emphasising its strong foundations and those aspects which are 
of particular relevance to China. Now that the weaknesses in China’s economy have 
been discussed, the argument proceeds to examine Hong Kong’s systems and their 
capacity to help the Mainland.
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IV. H ong Kong, CLina’s financial centre
With the return of Hong Kong to China, China has internalised a powerful 
international economic entity. China needs Hong Kong to fill a role for the Mainland 
which it is unprepared to fill itself, and thus Hong Kong’s economy is pre-eminent in 
China’s development plans. But it is a reciprocal economic relationship: as shall be 
evidenced, Hong Kong itself has exploited China’s needs for its own growth. Hong 
Kong itself profits from the attraction of foreign capital.
Hong Kong’s economic utility to China is possible because of the advanced 
economic systems that exist in the territory. This chapter stresses the firm 
foundations of the territoiy’s economy which underpin these systems and in the 
process establishes that Hong Kong is useful to China precisely because of its 
capitalist market mechanisms. Hong Kong forged a close relationship with the 
Chinese economy when the Mainland began opening up to foreign investment in the 
late 1970s. To benefit from China’s reforms, Hong Kong shaped its economy to 
provide the trade and financial services which China would require. In the 1980s 
Hong Kong made moves to strengthen the Hong Kong dollar and the local bourse in 
order to consolidate its position as one of the premier global financial centres. Today 
its economy has been shaken somewhat by the East Asian crisis, but because of the 
strength of the underlying fimdamentals (which are outlined below), Hong Kong has 
been able to weather the storm.
Background
Hong Kong is one of the original ‘tiger economies’, the group of four East 
Asian nations which radically transformed their developing economies into modern
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economic powerhouses. The group, comprising Taiwan. South Korea, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong, focused on developing their export industries and expanding their 
economies during the 1960s and 70s. Hong Kong has inherent advantages which it 
has exploited over the past four decades, including its geographical location and the 
best deep-water port on the Chinese coast. It has built on these advantages, 
developing an efficient administrative regime and the rule of law, a modern 
infrastructure, sound finances and low taxes, a free port and the unrestricted flow of 
capital. China is Hong Kong’s economic hinterland, and therefore Hong Kong’s own 
growth has been tied up with that of China. Hong Kong depended upon Chinese 
exports for goods, especially raw materials and food, which it was unable to provide 
for itself. Hong Kong’s success in achieving spectacular growth in the 60s and 70s 
was partly due to the supply of foodstuffs, consumer goods, and raw materials from 
China at prices much lower than at world levels. (Chau, 1983, 184) By helping to 
keep prices down, these inexpensive provisions helped to keep wages low, and thus 
inflation was minimised. As a major source of hard currencies, the Hong Kong 
market was apparently allotted a high priority by China with regard to selling food. 
(Chau,1983,196)
Hong Kong was not economically prominent for the earlier part of the 
century, acting as a useful port but taking a back seat to the thriving East Asian 
banking centre of Shanghai. During this time Hong Kong’s primary role was as an 
entrepot for the Chinese economy, providing trading services for goods flowing in 
and out of China. The Communist Revolution catalysed Hong Kong’s economic 
modernisation and forced the territory to make many of the changes that led it to 
become an financially significant entity. During the Communist Revolution in the 
late 1940s, many bankers, merchants, and entrepreneurs fled Mainland China and re-
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established their businesses in Hong Kong. Manufacturing truly developed on a large 
scale in the 1950s and continued in strong force through the 1970s; during this period 
Hong Kong was abundant in cheap labour in the form of immigrants from the 
Mainland. Another crucial turning point in Hong Kong’s development was the U.S. 
embargo on goods imported from China during the Korean War in the 1950s and an 
UN embargo on the export of strategic goods to China. The embargoes subsequently 
muffled much of Hong Kong’s trade flows with China, and in order to maintain its 
trade activity with the rest of the world, Hong Kong nurtured its own manufacturing 
base. Its manufacturing industry thrived through the 1960s and 70s, excepting a 
recession in 1974-75 when labour costs rose and as other Asian countries moved into 
manufacturing. (Scott, 1990, xix)
A breakthrough for the Hong Kong economy came at the end of 1978, when 
Deng Xiaoping recommended that the Chinese economy open up to foreign trade and 
investment. Reforms which were implemented in 1979 included the creation of 
SEZs, coastal areas intended to be open manufacturing and trading enclaves. 
Shenzhen, formerly a rural agricultural town directly across the border from Hong 
Kong, was designated as a SEZ. Chinese leaders recognised the importance of 
investment and export know-how from Hong Kong, and the economic incentives 
provided by the PRC government encouraged Hong Kong industrialists to move their 
labour-intensive operations across the border. Many thought that in 1978 when China 
began its course of economic reforms, Hong Kong’s significance would decline as 
China would no longer use it as its main point of access to the rest of the world. 
However, Hong Kong adapted to these new conditions in China to become even more 
relevant to the Chinese economy as its primary link with the international economy. 
(Yahuda, 1996, 23)
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Trade
Hong Kong’s economy relies heavily upon two sectors: services and trade. 
The natural harbour and the territory’s strategic location on the South China Sea give 
it two important advantages over any other city in the Pacific, and it has exploited 
these advantages to become a premier trading centre. Approximately one-fourth of 
the world’s shipping moves through the South China Sea, and Hong Kong is 
advantageously situated to facilitate the trade in the region. (Weidenbaum and 
Hughes, 1996, 17) Hong Kong’s trade volume is two and a half times its GDP, and 
its port is the busiest in the world in terms of container tliroughput. (Interview with 
director of China Trade, HKGTD, October 1997) Hong Kong’s economic growth is 
solid: GDP grew by 3.9% in 1995, and by 4.9% in 1996. Services account for the 
majority of GDP, with manufactures taking a decreasing role in Hong Kong’s 
economy. The service sector accounted for 84% of Hong Kong’s GDP in 1995, while 
manufacturing only contributed 9.3% of the 1994 GDP. About 80% of Hong Kong’s 
manufactured goods are for export, and its major export markets were China (35%), 
the U.S. (21%), and the European Union (15%). (HKTDC Web Page, updated 7 
November 1997)
Hong Kong’s port, situated on the territory’s augmented natural harbour, is 
promoted by government policy of no import or export tariffs, contributing to Hong 
Kong’s status as the world’s seventh largest trading economy in 1996. (Hong Kong 
Government Information Services, 1997, 1) China currently relies upon Hong Kong 
to ship most of its exports from southern China to the rest of the world. According to 
Mr. Ba Sang Yeung, director of China Trade at the Hong Kong Government Trade 
Department, it is more efficient for China to transport goods to Hong Kong via
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railway, and use Hong Kong’s port to ship to other parts of the world, than to use 
northern China ports. Re-exports are an increasingly important part of Hong Kong’s 
trade, confirming Hong Kong’s role as an entrepot economy. Re-exports account for 
more than half of Hong Kong’s total trade, and in the first nine months of 1997, 85% 
of Hong Kong exports were re-exports. (HKTDC Web Page, updated 7 November 
1997) Hong Kong’s re-export trade from 1992 to 1996 is shown in Figure 2, clearly 
revealing the vital role Hong Kong has played recently in handling China’s trade. For 
each of the years shown, trade with China has accounted consistently for more than 
89% of Hong Kong’s total re-export trade, and has grown by about a percent year on 
year. Thus in 1992 Hong Kong’s re-exports involving China trade were 89%, but in 
1996 the re-export trade with China had increased to 93%. In the decade between 
1984 and 1994, China became the largest market for Hong Kong’s exports and the 
biggest supplier of its imports. (Yahuda, 1996, 25)
Hong Kong re-export trade
100% - / $ ' '
1995
□  other re-exports
B re-exports from China via HK to 
elsew here
B re-exports from HK to China
Figure 2
Source o f  data: Hong Kong Government Trade Department
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Another way to look at Hong Kong-China trade is through the stages of 
production model. Almost 55% of Hong Kong’s exports to China are for outward 
processing; these exports are used as inputs for a final good produced in China, and 
the final product is often re-exported to Hong Kong for onward shipping. Thus Hong 
Kong-China trade is very often not trade in final goods for consumption but inputs for 
stages of production. This exemplifies the highly integrated business relationship 
between Hong Kong and the Mainland, as the various phases of manufacture, trade 
and finance are located on both sides of the border. The Hong Kong Trade Industry 
and Customs Department introduced in February 1981 an ‘Outward Processing 
Arrangement’ under which ‘a certificate of Hong Kong origin may be issued in 
respect of a product if it can be established that despite certain intermediate processes 
of manufacture having been subcontracted out of Hong Kong, the terminal- or origin- 
conferring process has been carried out by a factoiy in Hong Kong registered with the 
Department for certification purposes.’ (Chai, 1983, 144)
Hong Kong’s role as a financial centre
As its manufacturing industries increasingly moved to China, Hong Kong 
turned to its service sector to generate economic growth in the territory. China 
requires a massive amount of capital to fund its growth, and with the opening of the 
Chinese economy to foreign investment, Hong Kong modified its own industrial 
makeup to take on the role of financier to the Mainland. This important role has 
defined Hong Kong ever since, and it has become one of the largest financial centres 
in the world. Hong Kong is the fifth largest financial centre in terms of volume of 
external banking transactions and fifth largest in terms of foreign exchange
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transactions. (Hong Kong Government Information Services, 1) As Hong Kong lias 
improved its capacity to manage financial transactions, it has increasingly exported 
capital. In 1996 Hong Kong was the fourth largest source of outward foreign direct 
investment in the world behind the US, the UK, and Germany, investing a total of 
US$27 billion. (HKTDC Web Page, 7 November 1997) As Hong Kong has financed 
China’s development, its banking, investment, and trade industries have expanded 
coiTespondingly. While Hong Kong can be classified as an international financial 
centre, its strength is in servicing the Chinese economy; international investors use 
Hong Kong as a base from which to conduct trade and investment in China and the 
East Asian region.
Hong Kong’s Stock Market
Hong Kong’s stock market takes advantage of its position between other 
major markets such as London and New York to provide continuous trading around 
the clock. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) was officially created in April 
1986 when the government urged four smaller existing stock exchanges to merge. 
Today there are 650 companies listed on the SEHK. To be list on the SEHK, firms 
must have been operating for three years, have a profit level of HK$20 million in the 
year prior to listing, and have a combined profit level of HK$30 million for the two 
years prior to that. At least 25% of the firm must be offered. (Berger and Lester, 
1997, 312) The SEHK is monitored by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission (SFC) which was created in 1989.
Data on stock market movements and exchange rate stability during crises 
shows that Hong Kong is sensitive to political shocks from China. The Hong Kong 
stock market and the exchange rate of the HK$ were sensitive to the state of relations
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between Britain and China during negotiations of Hong Kong’s sovereignty.  ^ The 
SEHK is subject to severe shocks partly because there is a lack of diversity among the 
type of companies listed on the SEHK. In the 1980s, the Hong Kong stock exchange 
topography was dominated by property sector stocks, which had the second largest 
market capitalisation and the greatest number of listings on the market of any sector. 
In mid-1997 the property sector continued to be the largest player in the SEHK, 
contributing about one-third of the value of stock market listings. (Ridding, 
Financial Times, 3 May 1997) This leaves the SEHK particularly vulnerable to 
certain types of shocks, specifically interest rate movements which are unfavourable 
to the real estate industry. The stock market is further concentrated by interlinked 
share holdings (listed companies holding shares in other listed ventures) and 
companies which are owned by the same parent group but traded separately. (Freris, 
1991, 100) Trading in Hong Kong’s stock market is confined to a small number of 
shares which account for a large percentage of the overall value and volume of the 
market’s activity—these shares also account for most of the market’s capitalisation. 
In the first 18 months of the operations of the unified stock exchange (April 1986 to 
August 1987) the top twenty most active shares accounted consistently for more than 
60% of the value of turnover and for over 65% of the market capitalisation. (Freris, 
1991, 102) With the health of the exchange so reliant upon the fortunes of a 
concentrated number of companies, it is perhaps not surprising that the SEHK is 
subject to extreme swings in fortune. In a study over 1971-1985, the Hong Kong 
stock market topped the list of exchanges in terms of the highest volatility and 
returns. (Freris, 1991, 169)
 ^For tlie most tiiorougli discussion on tlie effects of the negotiations on tlie Hong Kong stock exchange 
and exchange rate of tlie HK$, refer to Rafferty, 1991, pages 387-420.
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The most commonly quoted index of the SEHK is the Hang Seng Index (HSI), 
compiled by the Hang Seng Bank. The index comprises thirty-three leading stocks, 
with the base year as 1964. The composition of the HSI is changed frequently, with 
certain criteria employed to determine the constituent stocks; companies must have 
Hong Kong as their primary operational centre, they must have a minimum average 
monthly market value for a specified period, and they also must have a minimum 
aggregate monthly turnover value for a certain period. Furthermore, a company’s 
past and current earnings and growth and the nature of the business sector are taken 
into account. (Freris, 1991, 106)
Monetary regime
Hong Kong’s monetary system is overseen by the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA), the territory’s quasi-central bank created in 1993. The Hong 
Kong dollar (HK$) reached its lowest point in September-October 1983, when there 
was a large amount of uncertainty surrounding the Sino-British negotiations. This 
confidence crisis spread to the property sector, which in turn had an impact on the 
stock market. As investors shifted currencies, the pressure on the Hong Kong 
government mounted, and they felt it essential to intervene to restore confidence in 
the currency. The HK$ was pegged to the US$ at a paiity of US$1 = HK$ 7.80 
through the medium of the note issue and the exchange Find. The HK$ is run 
according to a currency board, which means that every unit of local currency is 
backed by a unit of foreign currency held in reserve.
Because of the dependence on the link, there is no independent monetary 
policy in Hong Kong; Hong Kong has relinquished control of the money supply and 
the interest rate mechanism. With the pegging of the HK$ to the US$, the Hong
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Kong economy became inextricably linked with the U.S. economy and the movement 
there of exchange and interest rates. Interest rates in Hong Kong are tied to those set 
by the Federal Reserve Board in the U.S. The government must maintain whatever 
money supply will support the pegged rate. The authorities can either fix the money 
supply or the exchange rate, but not both. According to the Mundell-Fleming 
approach developed in the 1960s, a country can have at most two of the following 
conditions: a fixed exchange rate, monetary policy autonomy, or capital mobility. 
Hong Kong of course has capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate, therefore it has 
relinquished monetary policy autonomy. Fixing the exchange rate in a world of 
mobile capital gives priority to a stable exchange rate over the ability of national 
policy to affect domestic prices. (Frieden, 446) Thus Hong Kong’s choice of a 
pegged rate reflects the importance of trade and the industries related to trade in the 
Hong Kong economy. Furthermore, non-tradable goods, such as land and housing, 
are more expensive in Hong Kong relative to other national economies. Between 
1959 and 1970 the average price per square foot of industrial land in the metropolitan 
areas (excluding the new Territories) went up from HK$9.70 to HK$102.90. (Chau, 
1983, 217) Instead of the exchange rate, the interest rates shoulder the impact of 
changes in liquidity and the money supply, and as a consequence Hong Kong has 
faced large fluctuations in the interest rate, especially during the recent Asian 
economic crisis.
The peg relies on investors’ conviction that the parity is set at a realistic level 
supported by economic fundamentals. Crucially, the ‘necessary condition for the 
maintenance of a parity for a currency is that investors believe that the authorities are 
committed to the parity, and will incur the necessary costs in terms of their domestic 
employment and price level objectives so that the parity can be maintained.’ (Aliber,
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1990, 202) Dming the recent economic downturn in East Asia, Hong Kong has 
shown that it is indeed prepared to stand by the currency at a large cost to the 
domestic economy. Hong Kong has a strong mechanism in place to maintain this 
parity, which is controlled through the HKIVIA. This parity works through the 
Exchange Fund, which was originally established in the 1920s to support the HK$ by 
keeping reserves ready to defend it. The Exchange Fund was later incorporated into 
the HKMA. The HKJVIA’s main responsibility and the main issue of monetary policy 
is to support tills peg. There are three note-issuing banks (NIBs), the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Standard Chartered, and the Bank of China. In 
order to maintain the peg, these banks deposit U.S. dollars with the Exchange Fund, 
and in return receive Certificates of Indebtedness (CIs) from the Exchange Fund. The 
CIs allow the NIBs to print HK$. The peg guarantees a fixed price of HK$7.80 worth 
of CIs for every US$ surrendered, and conversely the fund will buy back CIs for US$ 
at the same rate. Hong Kong has a unique peg in that the HK$ still floats freely on 
the foreign exchange market. The government relies on arbitrage to bring the open 
market price in line with the parity maintained for monetary purposes. Since every 
additional HK$ issued is backed by U.S. dollars, any inflow or outflow of HK$ has a 
direct effect on the money supply and on interest rates. (Freris, 1991, 188) However, 
the Hong Kong government seems well prepared to defend the parity, as it is required 
to deposit its budget surplus into the Exchange Fund. When the Financial Secretary 
revealed the last budget, he predicted a huge surplus for the 1997 fiscal year of 
HK$15.1 billion.
Until the recent Asian economic crisis, Hong Kong had the third largest 
foreign exchange reserves in the world. The HKMA is able to back the HK$ eight 
times over, as the Exchange Reserve Fund holds over US$80 billion, while there is
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approximately US$10 billion HlCS in circulation. (Interview with IVIr. Chad Leechor, 
HKMA, October 1997) According to Mr. Chad Leechor, head of Economic Research 
at the HKMA, there are no plans whatsoever to drop the peg or devalue the HK$, and 
the government will only consider doing so when it perceives there are no risks to 
investor confidence and the stigma of being a part of China no longer exists for Hong 
Kong. When questioned as to whether the HK$ was overvalued at the level of the 
peg, IVIr. Leechor conceded that it could be, but that this was different from the HK$ 
being sustainable. He believes that the HK$ is not oveivalued in the tradable goods 
sector, but that non-tradable goods prices are somewhat inflated. The peg has been 
successful, especially for the export-oriented economy which relies on a stable 
currency: there has been relative price stability, and the monetary system has been 
able to cope with confidence shocks. (Freris, 1991, 236) Thus, Hong Kong intends 
to keep the exchange rate peg and sees no signs of dropping it in the near future, not 
only for the fact that it has worked well in the past, but also because of the role it 
serves in securing investor confidence for the new Hong Kong regime under Chinese 
authority.
Hong Kong’s experience with the recent East Asian economic crisis
Beginning in July 1997, Thailand’s currency, the baht, came under increasing 
pressure to devalue as the government found the countiy’s economy faltering. With 
increased investments and big money projects going full speed ahead, but without the 
demand to match, Thailand was creating a bubble economy. Speculators were quick 
to move in and force the Thai currency lower. Unfortunately this scenario was being 
repeated tlnoughout the region, and Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines found 
their currencies the subject of attack. Poor economic policies in these countries were
64
often the culprit; these countries had found themselves on the receiving end of large 
inflows of capital, not only from private investors but also loans from foreign banks. 
This capital was not effectively managed and spent on projects that had poor returns. 
As things began to go wrong, investors pulled out and the loans dried up, 
compounding the crisis. As one country in East Asia fell, then inevitably 
interdependent neighbouring countries felt the effect. Speculators turned on the HK$ 
in October 1997, betting that Hong Kong could not stand its ground as (1) the HK$ 
would be much more expensive relative to the neighbouring depreciating currencies, 
and (2) Hong Kong would be unable or unwilling to defend the currency over a 
prolonged period. The speculative attack has caused Hong Kong some strain as the 
government has taken strong measures to defend the HK$. In order to defend the 
currency, HK$ interbank rates were raised as much as 300% at one point to tighten 
liquidity. By raising interest rates, Hong Kong jeopardised the property market, 
which dominates the stock market and has borrowed heavily from the banks. 
Property stocks were also hard hit as investors fled the market. The stock market 
took a dive, losing 38% through September and October 1997. Hong Kong’s case 
differs from that of the other Southeast Asian nations in that its economic 
fundamentals are sound and it has the reserves to back its currency. Estimates range 
from US$3 billion to US$8 billion as to the amount the Hong Kong government has 
spent to defend the currency, and these outlays are well covered by the over US$80 
billion Hong Kong has in foreign exchange reserves.
Public finance
Sound government finance is an enduring fundamental which inspires investor 
confidence in Hong Kong. The government has had a budget surplus for nine of the
65
past ten years, and it was estimated that Hong Kong would have a budget surplus 
again for financial year 1997/98. It is written into the Basic Law that Hong Kong 
must attempt to maintain a balanced budget (Article 107), and due to its restricted 
fiscal spending, Hong Kong has been able to keep substantial reserves and also lower 
taxes for certain brackets of the population. There is no capital gains tax, and for the 
1997/98 budget, the standard salary tax rate remained unchanged. Although there are 
demands on the government to spend its surplus, the Treasury Deputy Secretary 
explained that it is vital to have these reserves on hand for years of budget deficit, 
such as fiscal year 1995/96 when spending on the new airport reached it peak. 
(Interview, October 1997) If the Hong Kong government loses revenue, then these 
reserves will be necessary not only to maintain a balanced budget but also to support 
public spending as well as backing exchange rate of the HK$. There is no established 
government definition of what constitutes adequate fiscal reserves. Hong Kong has 
fared better than most other East Asian economies in the recent economic turndown, 
and this can be credited to sound management of the government’s finances. 
According to government estimates, Hong Kong will have fiscal reseiwes of HK$377 
billion at the end of the fiscal year 1998. This includes the reserves in the Land Fund, 
which is discussed below. (HKTDC Web Page, 7 November 1997)
All land, minus that which the Anglican church near the government offices is 
built upon, is owned by the government and is managed by the Planning, 
Environment, and Lands Bureau. The government regularly holds land auctions to 
lease the right to parcels of land. These are typically 75-year leases, and due to the 
scarcity of land, bidding often runs high. Thus substantial income is derived from the 
sale of these leases, but because land sales from year to year are variable, land 
revenue is not a stable source of revenue for the government. As the property sector
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was particularly hard hit in the Asian crisis, demand for property has weakened and 
land prices have fallen in the past year. Because the property sector is a dominant 
part of the Hong Kong economy and the SEHK, the property crisis has had a major 
impact on the whole of the territory’s economic health, which suffered but did not 
collapse.
Proceeds from land auctions in the twelve years before the handover were put 
in the Land Fund, which was set up in 1985 to assuage Beijing’s fears that the money 
made from government land auctions would be usurped by the British Hong Kong 
government. The revenue from land auctions was divided 50-50 between the post- 
1997 Hong Kong government and the pre-handover British Hong Kong government. 
After the handover, the Land Fund was merged again, with a windfall of a one-time 
payment of bankrolled revenues in the Land Fund from the previous twelve years 
going to the Hong Kong government.
Hong Kong government spending is quite low relative to other nations with 
similar per capita GDPs. It is this concept of minimal government intervention which 
has earned it the accolades of economists who view it as an example of true laissez 
faire capitalism at work. Public expenditure is only 18.3% of GDP, one of the lowest 
percentages of an industrial nation. The establishment of the budget begins with a 
Resource Allocation Exercise, in which the secretaries of the various government 
departments submit bids. Bids often outnumber resources five to ten times. 
(Interview with the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, October 1997) Resources are 
allocated according to the priority areas established in the Chief Executive policy 
address, the first of which was given by the new Chief Executive, Tung Chee Hwa, in 
October 1997. The budget also is allocated amongst ‘bread and butter’ items in the 
economy, such as government salaries. Once the expenses are determined, the
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revenue is estimated. It is at this point that the government decides if a tax raise is 
necessary or if, in fact, tax cuts are viable. Impressively, the government has not 
raised taxes in the past decade. There is a 15% tax ceiling, and in fact, only around 
80,000 individuals actually pay at the 15% level. It is a progressive tax system, and 
out of approximately 3.2 million working people, approximately half do not pay tax. 
The other half typically pays at a level of 5%. (Interview with the Deputy Secretary 
for the Treasury, October 1997) The Legislative Council must pass the government 
budget, and Beijing has no say in its determination.
The Hong Kong government is not a virtual hands-off government, as it is 
often perceived to be; on the contraiy, as the government is actively involved in many 
sectors of the economy. For example, Hong Kong supports the post-secondary 
education system, social security measures for the elderly, and housing for the 
majority of the populace. It is this last item which is one of the biggest areas of 
public expenditure. Because land is scarce, housing is affordable only for the 
wealthy. Thus the government subsidises mortgages for the middle classes so as to 
make owning a flat possible for the population at large. The Hong Kong Housing 
Authority is responsible for public housing, which it plans, builds, and manages. The 
Authority is required to cover its expenditure from its income, which it derives 
mainly from rent, although it can borrow free of interest from the official 
Development Loan Fund. The government provides land free of charge to the 
Authority. The government has created numerous New Towns in the New Territories 
which are purpose built condominiums: tower blocks of hundreds of apartments, 
usually including shopping areas, recreation areas, and entertainment facilities. 
Tlirough its involvement in the housing market and its numerous land reclamation
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projects the government has been accused of contributing to the overheating the 
property market and of raising inflation by increasing the housing and land supply.
Conclusion
Hong Kong’s economy has evolved over the last century, from low-value 
added trading entrepot to manufacturing powerhouse to a service-based economy. 
These stages in Hong Kong’s development have reflected the circumstances of 
China’s own political and economic evolution. China sent Hong Kong economic 
‘prompts’, such as the creation of the Shenzhen SEZ, which allowed Hong Kong to 
exploit the trade and investment oppoitunities on the Mainland. The result of Hong 
Kong working closely with the Chinese economy has been that Hong Kong has 
become the main source of investment for the Mainland. Hong Kong’s service to and 
support of the Chinese economy is corroborated in the next chapter with a look at the 
investment flows which Hong Kong manages for China.
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V. Capital movements
Since China opened to outside trade and investment at the end of 1978, capital 
flows between the China and Hong Kong have increased dramatically. Hong Kong 
has become inextricably linked with the economy of China due to trade and 
investment flows, and the following chapter explores the reasons behind this 
integration. China’s remarkable growth record has meant that there are potentially 
lucrative investment opportunities on the Mainland. However, there is no financial 
centre within China of Hong Kong’s calibre which has the necessary mechanisms to 
manage large inflows of foreign capital. Thus foreign companies wishing to invest on 
the Mainland often use Hong Kong as a stepping stone. As China’s premiere 
financial centre, Hong Kong has become an integral part of the Chinese economy; 
China depends heavily on Hong Kong’s economy, and vice versa. Correspondingly, 
the multitude of Chinese companies are not raising the necessary capital within the 
Mainland to ftind their operations and have increasingly looked to Hong Kong to help 
them attract investment. Thus both foreign and Chinese companies use Hong Kong 
for their investment activities because of its advanced mechanisms for servicing 
investment capital and the particular business atmosphere which allows these 
mechanisms to thrive.
Hong Kong serves the Chinese economy in three ways. Firstly, Hong Kong 
handles much of China’s trade, which was discussed in the previous chapter. 
Secondly, Hong Kong businesses invest an enormous amount on the Mainland, 
encouraging Chinese growth. Thirdly, Hong Kong links China with the rest of the 
world by acting as a base for foreign investors as well as hosting Chinese companies 
who are looldng to expand and raise capital beyond the Mainland. Because of the
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complexity of Chinese company activity in Hong Kong and the issue:, it raises, the 
succeeding chapter is devoted to this last point. To set the scene for an investigation 
into China’s expansion into the Hong Kong economy, it is important to evidence the 
foreign capital that Hong Kong attracts and manages for China. It is partially because 
of the presence of foreign funds in Hong Kong that Mainland companies are drawn to 
the enclave. As foreign companies increasingly use Hong Kong to access China and 
Chinese companies conversely use Hong Kong to access foreign capital for their 
operations, Hong Kong has become inseparable from the Chinese economy. Both 
China and Hong Kong benefit enormously from this relationship; there are no other 
developing countries with such a financial centre at their door to help acquire the 
necessary capital for growth. Hong Kong has remained its largest foreign direct 
investor ever since China began its economic reforms, and in each of China’s thirty 
provinces and municipalities except for five, Hong Kong ranked either first or second 
in both foreign trade and direct foreign investment. (Yahuda, 1996, 24) At the end of 
1996 Hong Kong investors were linked to 57% of foreign-funded projects in China. 
(HKTDC Web Page, 7 November 1997)
The next two chapters focus specifically on investment between China and 
Hong Kong: one side of the relationship, Hong Kong’s investment in China and 
foreign investors’ engagement of Hong Kong to ultimately invest in China is 
explained herein. The analysis then proceeds to explore the reverse relationship, 
China’s expansion in the Hong Kong economy. The ties between the two economies 
are part of the larger phenomena of the growth of the Greater China economic region 
and the immense economic activity of the Chinese overseas. Hong Kong serves as 
the doorway to China for Taiwan and the Chinese overseas, and as such, its own 
economy is bolstered by the capital which is serviced in the territoiy en route to
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China. Hong Kong is well positioned to take advantage of China's economic 
dealings not only with Taiwan and the Chinese overseas but with virtually all other 
foreign investors as well.
Greater China
Hong Kong forms part of Greater China, the economic network of Southern 
China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Greater China is a natural economic zone which has 
arisen out of economic transactions despite lack of political direction or involvement. 
Because of the close economic relationships between these areas, the economic 
network is a dynamic growth area that supersedes national boundaries and political 
ideology. In 1994 Hong Kong by far invested the most in China at US$20.2 billion 
than any other entity, and Taiwan was second with US$3.29 billion. (Goodhart and 
Xu, 1996, 75) More than two-thirds of the foreign money that has already flowed 
into China has come from Hong Kong or Taiwan. (Brauchli, Wall Street Journal, 14 
January 1997) This economic activity bodes very well for Hong Kong, which serves 
as a crucial link for Mainland China and Taiwan. The exploitation of the competitive 
advantages of each region has meant that each economy has focused on specialised 
areas of activity. As land and labour costs increased in Hong Kong and Taiwan in the 
1980s, companies moved their low-end manufacturing production sites to southern 
China, primarily into the SEZs. The Hong Kong economy has mainly become 
service-oriented, dealing with shipping and banking activities, and the Taiwanese 
economy has moved into more high-tech, less-labour intensive industries. The 
synergy created between these economies has created an economic giant that is a 
world force: taken as one entity, this economic area has the third largest GNP in the
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world, the largest foreign exchange resei vc-s and lüe thiid largest foreign trade 
turnover. (Shambaugh, 1995, 3)
Taiwan does not have formal trade or diplomatic ties with China, nor does it 
maintain direct shipping links, and thus Hong Kong serves as the nexus for the 
Taiwanese and Chinese economies. Taiwan trades with China through Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan uses Hong Kong as a base for its investment to the Mainland, currently at 
a level of about US$20 billion. (Rlchburg, Washington Post, 2 February 1997) 
China claims Taiwan as a breakaway republic, while increasingly Taiwan is leaning 
toward independence, evidenced with the first direct election of its president in 1996. 
It is not likely that Taiwan and China will resolve their differences in the near future, 
and thus Hong Kong will continue to be important in serving as the link between the 
two.
The Chinese overseas network
A well-documented economic force in the global economy is the ‘bamboo 
network’, the community of Chinese overseas businesspeople. Chinese overseas play 
an important part in the development of Hong Kong, not only in its growth as a 
financial centre but also in strengthening its ties with Mainland China.^ Chinese 
overseas refer to the collective population, estimated to be around 55 million, of 
Chinese people who have emigrated from China and settled in other countries in 
Southeast Asia, North America, and Europe. (This definition includes the ethnic 
Chinese populations in Hong Kong and Taiwan.) Chinese people in many of these 
places have become successâü entrepreneurs, and over the years have developed
 ^Following tlie example set in Greater China: The Next Superpower? (Shambaugh, 1995), I refer to 
populations of etlinic Chinese people living in non-native countries as Chinese overseas, distinguisliing 
them from overseas Cliinese, tliose Chinese who are temporarily living abroad.
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large business empires. As estimated by the World Banlc, the combined economic 
output of Chinese overseas was nearly US$400 billion in 1991. (Weidenbaum and 
Hughes, 1996, 25) In Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, 
companies owned by ethnic Chinese make up about 70% of the private business 
sector. (Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996, 8) The Charoen Pokphand Group is a good 
example of the success of Chinese overseas. Based in Bangkok, Thailand, the CP 
Group is run by Sumet Jiaravanon, a Chinese overseas who is the grandson of the 
company’s founder, ChiaEk Chor. Chia Ek Chor fled Communist China in 1949 and 
moved the seed company he had started in Shantou, China, to Bangkok. The 
company, which began in the chicken feed business, grew and diversified into 
interests such as motorcycles and petrochemicals, and is now allegedly the single 
largest investor in Mainland China, each one of its divisions having established a joint 
venture. (Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996, 32) Their after-tax profit in China in 1994 
was US$50.4 million. (Gargan, New York Times) Today CP Group controls more 
than 200 affiliated companies, only 14 of which are publicly listed.
As many of the Chinese overseas traveled through Hong Kong emigrating 
from China, Hong Kong has long been perceived as the headquarters of this overseas 
network, and thus the great majority of fimds that come from Chinese overseas 
destined for China flow thi'ough Hong Kong. Hong Kong has well developed this 
role through the development of its financial industry. Since 1978, more than 75% of 
the direct foreign investment in China (estimated by the end of 1994 as a cumulative 
total of US$100 billion) has come from or through Hong Kong. (Yahuda, 1996, 7) 
The overseas Chinese typically have extensive business and government connections 
in China, which give them an edge for investment into projects in Mainland China. It 
can also be argued that the overseas Chinese are obviously more familiar with
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Chinese way of doing business, and can manipulate these knowledge advantages. 
Chinese overseas investors do not mind putting money into China for long-term 
investments which may not pay off for a long time because they view their 
investments as aiding their homeland; furthermore, they are willing to take risks other 
foreign investors might not take due to their experience with the Chinese economy 
and their connections which allows them to secure informal contracts. Chinese 
overseas have succeeded in China because of guanxi (connections) and networks to 
deal with the Chinese bureaucracy. Not only are they familiar with the country and 
the language, and therefore do not have to go through middlemen, they are familiar 
with and are willing to participate in certain Chinese business practices, such as 
paying bribes in order to push the project tlirough various levels. As the rule of law, 
business law in particular, is still a fairly underdeveloped concept in China, the 
acquiescence of the cadres at various levels must be secured before business can be 
conducted. Local government officials control the economy in their area, and the 
necessary guanxi makes these business deals go smoothly.
The Chinese business community often does not rely on formal contracts but 
on handshake agreements. Siu-lun Wong, in his aiticle on business tmst among 
Chinese, hypothesises that trust is the glue which binds Chinese overseas 
businesspeople and their counterparts in China. (Wong, 1991) This is also directly 
related to the notion of ‘face’ among Chinese. Maintaining face is crucial to the 
Chinese, and this notion is made manifest in their business dealings. If a business 
deal goes sour, the person responsible loses face, and subsequently is less likely to 
secure friture business deals in the future. Trust is important in reducing transaction 
costs for the Chinese overseas: formal contracts are replaced by an implicit
understanding between parties that the deal will be adhered to in the spirit of saving
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face. Chinese overseas conglomerates are typically privately owned, lamily-run, and 
conduct a large amount of their business activity in trading, holding, and shipping 
interests. These conglomerates hold interests in other, perhaps family-connected, 
conglomerates, which in turn have holdings in the parent corporation, creating a 
complex, inter-connected ownership network between divisions or different 
companies owned by the same family or parent company. Some of the interests in 
these corporations are publicly listed, but often ownership is a tangled network of 
family ownership. Family ownership serves two purposes. As the family is the basic 
unit of trust in traditional Chinese society, Chinese overseas are more willing to 
conduct business with family members. Because business deals are often verbal 
agreements based on this highly binding and forceful concept of keeping face, 
transaction costs are minimised. Secondly, because wealth is privately held, these 
corporations may do with their profits as they please.
Chinese overseas have increasingly selected to invest their fortunes in China 
as its economy has opened up to outside investment. Taken as an economic entity, 
Chinese overseas are the largest investors in Mainland China, and have formed more 
that 100,000 joint ventures in China. (Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996, 5 and 27) 
Many of these Chinese are discriminated against as a racial minority in their adopted 
homelands, and thus they have made attempts to redistribute their wealth to Mainland 
China. Many of the overseas Chinese left behind family when they emigrated from 
China, and some of the money sent back to China is in the form of gifts to relatives. 
Chinese overseas often tend to prefer investing in the particular regions in China in 
which they may have familial ties. The overseas population who have left China are 
typically from the eastern and coastal provinces and consequently have invested 
largely in this area. Thus these fast-growth areas have been able to take advantage of
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the establishment of the SEZ free trade areas with the investment of Chinese 
overseas.
The extent of Chinese overseas investment in China and the particular 
development of the Hong Kong economy would not be possible in the first place had 
there not been reforms on the Mainland. If China had not opened its borders, there 
could not have been the formation of Greater China or the opportunity for Chinese 
overseas to develop trade and investment relations via Hong Kong with Mainland 
China. Having said that, China’s amazing double digit growth for much of the past 
15 years and the development of its industries and economy was dependent upon 
foreign investment and trade, of which the Chinese overseas has provided a majority. 
In 1992 it was estimated that about 75 percent of investment in China came from 
Chinese overseas. (Cable and Ferdinand, 1994, 246) Four years later, in 1996, the 
percentage of investment from Chinese overseas was roughly the same, with 70% of 
the US$490 billion in foreign investments in China originating from Chinese 
overseas. (Richburg, Washington Post, 26 January 1997) For continued investment 
in China, Chinese overseas will be looking for China to maintain policies which will 
further a Greater China and will look for signs of stability within China and its 
adjustment to international relationships. (Yahuda, 32-33)
Hong Kong has benefited from the growing network and successes of 
expatriate Chinese. With Hong Kong serving as the link between Chinese overseas 
and China, the city is at the centre of a network of Chinese overseas companies from 
all over the world. In this sense, Hong Kong is well placed for the next few decades 
as these Chinese overseas companies continue to expand, which will further serve to 
expose Hong Kong to international business activity. Hong Kong’s role to the 
Chinese overseas goes hand in hand with its role as the epicentre for Greater China.
77
As Hong Kong continues to mediate between China’s economy and these economic 
entities, it will be better placed to service investment between all foreign investors 
and the Mainland.
Foreign investors and Hong Kong
By using Hong Kong to enter the Chinese market as opposed to entering 
China directly, foreign investors are choosing to reduce their transaction costs. The 
concentration of a wide variety of companies and the open and fair system of 
conducting business imply that a corporation is able to explore and secure business 
relationships relatively easily. Hong Kong’s advanced financial systems, including 
the fact that its currency is fully convertible, mean that it is better prepared to manage 
capital than the Mainland. Of the US$150 billion foreign direct investment in China 
from 1980-95, three-fifths came from or through Hong Kong. {The Economist, 12 
October 1996, 109)
The American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong conducts an annual 
survey of its members to gauge business confidence and activity in the territory, and 
the results of the 1996 survey revealed that a majority of those surveyed had 
operations in China. It is evident from Figure 3 that an increasing number of 
companies are investing in the Mainland from Hong Kong. The survey found that 
71% of members that had responded had operations in China, up from 53% in 1992. 
Of the companies with existing operations in China, 86% plan to make additional 
investments in the Mainland. Furthermore, 49% of the companies that did not have a 
presence in China planned to make an initial investment in China over the next three 
years, a statistic which confirms that it is popular practice to use Hong Kong as a base 
from which to invest in China. (AMCHAJVI Survey, November 1996, 3)
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One of the reasons why Hong Kong is an ideal place in which to organise 
investment schemes or joint ventures in China is the established set of laws governing 
contracts and agreements. Quite often it is the legal expertise of Hong Kong firms 
who know the Chinese system and often have Chinese contacts who arrange business 
contracts between westerners and Chinese. The legal system in China is lacking in 
many ways, but most notably in the area of business law; contracts in China have 
often lacked legal weight behind them. The legal system in China has been slow to 
reform, and Hong Kong will most definitely have an important role to play in 
providing legal expertise when organising business and investment deals.
Hong Kong’s thoroughly modern network of financial institutions has also 
meant that the city is in a prime position to facilitate investment in Mainland 
businesses. There are over 185 banks in the territory, thus project finance and foreign
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exchange are readily available. China’s banking system, on the other hand, is far 
from being liberalised. The Bank of China is still the Mainland’s primary banlc and 
the only one until recently allowed to deal in yuan, the Chinese currency. The Bank 
of China is centrally controlled and is under obligation to provide a constant source of 
‘loans’ to the SOEs. The SOEs are in desperate need of reform, although reform 
would mean a massive overhaul of the Chinese economic system. Were the SOEs to 
shut down, this would cause mass unemployment in China and be a major impetus for 
political destabilisation. Thus they continue to fund the redundant state industries, 
which has repercussions on the banking industry. Because the Bank of China must 
prop up the SOEs, its own goals are divided; it must try to control inflation while at 
the same time continually providing funds to the SOEs. It wants to promote growth 
and a tight monetary economy, but finds it must balance these goals against its 
obligations to the state sector. Thus the banking system in China remains contrary to 
reform, (1) structurally, as the banldng system is tightly regulated; (2) intrinsically, 
with the lack of full currency convertibility; and (3) relationally, as it must support 
the state industries. The underlying problem of the state sector must be addressed 
before the banking sector can undergo tme reform, but the reform of the SOEs will be 
a long and arduous process.
Hong Kong serving China
Since it opened its economy, China’s understanding of Hong Kong has not 
deviated from the central premise that Hong Kong is useful for China’s growth and 
modernisation. Hong Kong has fLilfilled its unofficial mandate thus far set by the 
Chinese government to aid the Mainland in its economic development. The issue of 
Hong Kong’s return to China has done nothing to diminish its ability to attract capital
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from foreign sources and derive frinds internally to send on to China, birect 
investment in Hong Kong totalled US$99.7 billion at the end of 1995, an increase of 
11% from 1994. (HKTDC Web Page, 7 November 1997) Knowing that Hong Kong 
is a source and conduit for capital, China has established plans to use Hong Kong to 
further develop China’s economy, industry, and infrastructure. China’s Ninth Five 
Year Plan, which is the Chinese economic blueprint for 1996 through the year 2000, 
as well as the economic plans for 1996-2010, address the issue of getting Hong Kong 
to serve the country as a whole. According to the Ninth Five Year Plan, the HKSAR 
is expected to continue to help the Mainland raise funds and attract investments. 
Beijing hopes that Hong Kong will respond to its signals and that it will be able to 
lead international investors in the direction of China’s planned economic 
development, such as increased growth in the interior. (Yahuda, 1996, 137) Hong 
Kong is indeed responsive to these desires on the part of the Mainland to provide 
funds for development projects. According to the HKTDC, at the end of 1994 
venture capital frmds totalling US$6 billion were managed out of Hong Kong, the 
bulk of which was invested in China. (HKTDC, 1996, 19)
To attract the necessary capital, Hong Kong continues to strive to sustain an 
environment which is conducive to the modern, imiovative operations of foreign 
businesses and financial institutions. Moves to strengthen Hong Kong’s legal system, 
the HKS, and the city’s financial regulations are all a part of the effort to consolidate 
Hong Kong’s position as an international financial centre. According to a survey 
conducted by the Hong Kong Investment Funds Association, approximately 70% of 
funds managed in Hong Kong come from outside of the territory. (HKTDC, 1996, 
19) Xu Jiatun, head of the Xinhua news agency, which was China’s de facto 
representation in the territory while it was under British rule, was quoted in 1987 as
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saying, ‘Hong Kong plays a unique role in assisting the motherland in publicising and 
pursuing its policy of openness. It can serve the motherland in obtaining the 
economic information of the world and absorbing the experiences of management, 
capital, technology and professionals.’ (Rafferty, 1991,326-327) China wants Hong 
Kong to be open and attractive to foreign investment, but also to suppress subversive 
elements, so that outside influences are kept at arms length and are not directly 
corrupting.
Hong Kong’s economic hinterland
As Mainland China is Hong Kong’s economic hinterland, Hong Kong realises 
with its investments in China it is facilitating China’s growth and by extension the 
strengthening of its own economy. Not only has Hong Kong become the largest 
investor in China, but China is the second largest investor in Hong Kong, Chinese 
investment in Hong Kong is estimated to be between US$25 billion and US$45 
billion. (Richburg, Washington Post) China’s investment in Hong Kong may be 
underreported due to the large capital outflows from the Mainland which are 
unaccounted for. Because Hong Kong does not have any restrictions or reporting 
requirements on capital flows, the territory is a useful offshore centre for Mainland 
capital outflows which are not sanctioned by the government. Unofficial capital 
outflows from a country are often represented in the errors and omissions category in 
the balance of payments statistics. The errors and omissions figure for China in 1996, 
in which the capital outflow was recorded at US$16 billion, was greater than its trade 
surplus. (Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, October 1997, 7) According to Chinese 
officials, Hong Kong is the recipient of about 80% of this outflow which goes to flind 
Chinese business expansion and the purchase of property and financial assets.
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(Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, 1997, S) Because Hong Kong haa a currency boaid (and 
thus the currency value does not fluctuate), an inflow of foreign flinds will be 
accounted for by a rise in the territory’s foreign exchange reserves, and in fact a rise 
in Hong Kong’s reserves have virtually mirrored an increase in the value of China’s 
errors and omissions statistic. (Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, 1997, 8) This statistic 
also denotes that there is an enormous amount of excess liquidity in China from the 
new wealth that is being created which does not have adequate investment 
opportunities on the Mainland, and much of this liquidity is channelled to Hong Kong 
illicitly. If the unofficial capital outflows from China to Hong Kong (80% of US$16 
billion = US$12.8 billion) are added to the official investment, then China’s 
investment in the territory could possibly exceed an amazing US$57.8 billion.
China’s growth means that its indigenous companies will be looking for 
opportunities to expand, and Hong Kong is the logical stepping stone for these 
companies to move into the global economy. The Hong Kong Chinese Enterprises 
Association (HKCEA), incorporated in 1991, acts as a chamber of commerce for 
Mainland Chinese enterprises registered in Hong Kong. The HKCEA emphasises 
that its reasons for expanding in Hong Kong are, logically, those of familiarity and 
the existence already of a large amount of capital flows between the two economies: 
‘(t)he reason why we selected the Hong Kong market is that, Hong Kong, being one 
of the international centres, is economically connected with the Mainland most 
closely. ...Therefore, we feel sure of success if our enterprises are listed in the Hong 
Kong stock market.’ (HKCEA, 1995, 18) Hong Kong embodies a certain amount of 
security for Chinese companies because the territory ultimately is part of China. 
Because of the past successes of Chinese companies listed on the SEHK, other 
Chinese companies are optimistic in their ability to tap these funds. Chinese investors
are also anxious for the oppoitunity to meei the plethora oi' western nusiness contacts 
in the territory. As Chinese companies raise money for their Mainland operations in 
Hong Kong, these frmds are repatriated, contributing to the sum of capital which 
Hong Kong manages for China. It has been estimated that about 40% of Hong 
Kong’s investment in China are from companies with Chinese ties in Hong Kong, 
including Mainland banks which account for much of this investment. (Fung, 1997, 
81)
Chinese companies had new expectations for their growth and development 
with the promise of Chinese control of Hong Kong when the Sino-British loint 
Declaration was signed in 1984. In 1985 the HKTDC gave a figure of HK$30 billion 
for China’s investment in Hong Kong. (Rafferty, 1991, 331) By 1988 Chinese 
investment in Hong Kong was estimated at US$10 billion, higher than the US$6 
billion invested by U.S. companies. (Rafferty, 1991, 333) Five years later, in 1993, 
investment was estimated at US$20 billion, a 100% increase fi'om 1988, making 
China the largest investor in Hong Kong. (Chan, 1995, 941) Chinese investments in 
Hong Kong in recent years are calculated to be growing at more than 25% annually. 
(Chen, Wall Street Journal, 29 November 1996) With the expectation of Chinese 
sovereignty of Hong Kong came increased economic activity in the territory by 
Mainland interests, perhaps with an implicit assumption that ultimate sovereignty 
would make Chinese investments more ‘at home’ in the territory. Apart from any 
impact they may have due to sheer size, Chinese investments should be subject to 
scrutiny because they are unique from any other type of foreign investment in Hong 
Kong and pose particular problems to the integrity of the Hong Kong economy.
This chapter has shown the extent to which Hong Kong facilitates investment 
in Mainland China. This is precisely role that China had hoped Hong Kong would
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play with the inception of Chinese economic reforms. China sought to gain control of 
Hong Kong in order to have a closer relationship with the territory and greater 
influence in terms of being able to shape the political makeup of the territory’s 
government, which it wanted to be sympathetic to business interests. The political 
environment would then be conducive to attracting foreign companies and supporting 
investment activity, which could be channelled to the Mainland. The foreign capital 
which is managed in the territory is a poweiiul reason for Chinese companies to have 
a presence in Hong Kong, so that they can take advantage of the availability of funds. 
Chinese conglomerates are also interested in the opportunities for expansion and the 
prospects for investing in various sectors and businesses that the territoiy presents. 
The argument that China’s relationship with Hong Kong is best understood when 
analysed from China’s economic motivations now proceeds to an account of Chinese 
companies operating in the territoiy. A description of the activities of the companies 
evidences the ways in which China participates in the Hong Kong economy in order 
to access capital as well as investment oppoitunities.
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VI. Chinese companies in H ong Kong
The previous chapters have established that Hong Kong is the most important 
trading partner, investment source, and economic development tool for Mainland 
China. Hong Kong is also the most important channel for investment to the 
Mainland, as well as the Mainland’s window to the global economy, acting as a 
platform for the Mainland to raise money and invest overseas. China expects Hong 
Kong to be a bridge to the outside world, and in this role Hong Kong facilitates 
economic and legal transactions for Chinese companies that do not have access to 
certain market mechanisms in China. Chinese companies have moved into Hong 
Kong in greater numbers in the past decade, and now account for a large portion of 
the Hong Kong economy. China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Relations estimates that 80% of Chinese companies’ international investment is in 
Hong Kong. (Kim Eng Securities, 1996, 8) Mainland enterprises are categorised by 
their structure and ownership: those that are listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong (SEHK) are divided into two groups, red chips and H shares. Government- 
owned red chip companies, the listed vehicles of China’s most successful 
conglomerates, are given special consideration later in the chapter because of the 
important role they play in the Hong Kong economy.
Chinese company involvement in the territory is highly influential; China is 
the second largest investor in the territory after Britain, and as such it contributes a 
great deal to the Hong Kong economy. With this in mind, it is important to explore 
the nature of business conducted by Chinese companies in Hong Kong. Thousands of 
Chinese companies are involved in the Hong Kong economy. Just of those 
companies that are members of the HKCEA, (for there are many smaller Chinese
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enterprises that are not members or those which are operating in the territoiy without 
Chinese government permission), there are approximately 1090. (HKCEA 
Membership Directoiy, 1995) Chinese companies are moving into Hong Kong in 
great numbers, and, in fact, have greatly increased their presence in the past decade. 
A conservative estimate states that Hong Kong Chinese companies conduct 20% of 
business activity in Hong Kong. (HKCEA Annual Report, 1995, 41)
There are vital differences between Chinese businesses and other ‘foreign’ 
businesses operating in Hong Kong, and it is because of the unique nature of Chinese 
investments in the territory that Chinese business activity warrants investigation. 
First of all, Chinese companies, although given foreign status in Hong Kong, 
originate from Hong Kong’s parent country. Significantly, the largest and most 
powerful Chinese companies are government owned. While some TVEs and private 
enterprises are involved in the Hong Kong economy, they do not operate on the same 
scale as government-owned companies in terms of the scope and size of their 
investments in the territory. As China is Hong Kong’s master. Mainland company 
activity in the territory, especially in vital industries, has interesting implications. 
Namely, bureaucrats who form government policy who also have business interests 
can utilise government information to the benefit of their corporate interests in Hong 
Kong. In addition, government-owned company involvement in Hong Kong also 
provides a form of representation in the territory for the various levels of Chinese 
government (city, province, and national), which gives the Chinese government 
another, unofficial avenue of power. The Chinese government, through its companies 
operating in the territory, is free to lobby the Hong Kong government for policy 
formation or reform, expand its representation among the business elite in the 
territory, and increase its presence on the boards of other companies as well as its
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membership in tiade and commerce groups. Hong Kong’s open, free economic 
system means that it would allow this representation to operate without a sufficient 
counter-balance to maintain its economic independence.
Secondly, China is a developing country and consequently must deal with 
problems of adopting market mechanisms while still holding onto socialist mores. 
There are a host of issues such as inflation, currency convertibility, and banking 
reform that China must confront, and in the process it could be a rocky road for 
China’s indigenous companies. Hong Kong is therefore susceptible to imported risk, 
especially via Chinese business activity in the territory. Chinese companies are 
dealing with a less-than-stable home country economic environment, which has 
consequences for exchange rates, capital repatriation, and business growth and 
stability. Chinese companies compete for government resources and are vulnerable to 
power plays between government agencies. Decisions taken by the Chinese 
government about the national economy, especially those regarding the reform of 
SOEs and managing inflation, directly affect government-owned enterprises.
Thirdly, government officials control access to the Chinese economy, and it is 
these same officials who run Chinese companies, many of which have representation 
in Hong Kong. Furthermore, certain Chinese companies in Hong Kong have 
monopoly rights to certain sectors or areas in China, and thus they are the point of 
contact for any business interested in entering those markets. It makes logical 
business sense to form relationships with the people and companies that are the 
gatekeepers to investment on the Mainland. Thus Chinese companies that are 
controlled by or have connections to the bureaucrats who regulate access to China’s 
economy exercise hold certain taimp cards in Hong Kong, Their leverage arises 
because Hong Kong is the principal gateway to China for investment flows, and Hong
Kong and foreign companies which are interested in investing in China will seek 
relationships with the companies which provide access to the markets. In seeking 
these relationships, Chinese companies are often the benefactor of privileged deals, 
for example purchasing shares in companies at a reduced rate (a fact which was 
confirmed in an interview with Ms. Jeannie Cheung, director of China research at 
Paribas Asia Equity, a fund management firm in Hong Kong). This has the obvious 
implication for Hong Kong in that while it was once lauded for its open and fair 
economic system, Chinese company involvement could negatively affect this 
reputation.
It is with these considerations that the following analysis has been undertaken 
to examine the extent to which Chinese companies have the power to affect the Hong 
Kong economy. It is important to examine Chinese company investment in the 
territory, more so than other ‘foreign’ investment, as Chinese companies have the 
potential to influence the territory much more so than any other type of foreign 
business activity.
Chinese company representation in Hong Kong
Supposedly Chinese companies must request permission from the government 
before they can open a subsidiary in Hong Kong, but many Chinese companies, 
especially smaller enterprises, find ways of moving into the Hong Kong economy by 
bypassing this restriction. It is difficult to estimate the number of Chinese companies 
that are established in Hong Kong for the very reason that some companies are 
anxious to keep their profits and business activity from the auspices of Chinese 
authorities. Balance sheets for Chinese non-financial firms in Hong Kong are not 
readily available; the problem of transparency is compounded by the practice of using
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Hong Kong residents as ‘fronts’ to disguise real ownership. (Jao, 1983, 45) The 
Chinese government estimates that there are about 1800 Mainland companies 
registered in Hong Kong, with assets totalling at least US$43.5 billion dollars. 
Another estimate posits that there are over 10,000 companies operating with Chinese 
capital. (Richburg, Washington Post, 26 January 1997) The later estimate includes 
those businesses that are operating in Hong Kong without official permission, 
although the actual number could be much higher than this.
Chinese businesses can be categorised into tliree groups: the officially 
registered firms that are regulated by Beijing, the subsidiary firms that have approval 
to operate from their parent company or from their provincial authorities, and the 
unofficial or illegal firms. Almost every Chinese provincial government has 
corporate representation in Hong Kong, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is 
thought to be the largest investor in the territory with a large number of the estimated 
20,000 companies under its control believed to be in Hong Kong. (Richburg, 
Washington Post, 26 Januaiy 1997) The PL A is also believed to be one of the major 
participants in smuggling and black market operations between China and Hong 
Kong, especially as their vehicles are exempt from searches on the Mainland. 
Supposedly, Chinese naval units account for 50% of the piracy in the South China 
Sea. (Bueno de Mesquita, 1996, 93) Many Chinese business interests aren’t large, 
but are looking for market information and investments to channel back to China. 
(Chen, Wall Sti'eet Journal, 29 November 1996) A lack of access to funds in 
Mainland China is a considerable reason why Chinese companies want to expand into 
Hong Kong. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the total number of enterprises on the 
Mainland is close to eight million, and yet there are only 388 companies listed on the 
Shanghai stock exchange, and roughly the same number each listed on the Beijing
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and Shenzhen bourses. (rVilen, présenta non, October 1997) As explained
in Chapter 3, the Chinese authorities work to keep the exchanges within their control, 
and although the demand to list on the exchange is high, only a small number of 
companies is allowed to list. Therefore, although only 39 or so Chinese companies 
are listed on the SEHK, other Mainland firms are able to access fimds from foreign 
sources in Hong Kong in various other ways such as loans, direct foreign investment, 
and forming partnerships with foreign companies.
Data taken from the HKCEA notes that in 1994-95 Mainland companies had 
the following market share in Hong Kong: banking (24%), insurance (20%), tourism 
to China (60%), transportation (20%). Further figures provided from a separate study 
include market share for foreign trade (22%) and construction (12%). (Allen, 1997, 
206) Chinese businesses, in a relatively short span of time, have gained an 
impressive market share in major business areas in Hong Kong. Two striking 
examples of Chinese expansion in the territory are China Overseas Holdings Ltd., 
owned by the Chinese Ministry of Construction, and China National Aviation 
Corporation (CNAC). China Overseas began to invest actively in 1984 after Britain 
and China signed the Joint Declaration, and most recently had the massive 
responsibility of constructing the terminal for the new Hong Kong aiiport.
The case of CNAC is a bit more disconcerting regarding its expansion into 
Hong Kong. Swire Pacific Limited, a British blue ship company, sold a major stake 
of its regional airline, Dragonair, to CNAC, the commercial arm of China’s aviation 
regulator in April 1996. This was after a determined attempt by CNAC to gain access 
to the Hong Kong airline market. CNAC first announced its intentions in 1995, 
signalling that it planned to launch its own short-haul airline to compete with 
Dragonair, short distance carrier for Cathay Pacific, on Mainland China routes and
91
routes to Taiwan. Shares in Dragonair were offered by Swire to CNAC to prevent the 
creation of a new airline that would directly compete with the regional carrier. After 
a year of negotiations, CNAC acquired a 35.86% stake in Dragonair. CNAC bought 
these shares at as 20-30% discount to the value of the Dragonair shares had they been 
offered on the stock market. (Allen, 1997, 226) At the time, slightly more than half 
of Dragonair was owned by CITIC, the most successful Chinese conglomerate, which 
was apparently directed by Beijing to sell off the majority of its shares to CNAC, thus 
reducing its stake from 25% to 10%. This is an interesting example of two Mainland 
companies with competing interests, and how government politics plays an important 
role determining the business strategy of these companies. As foreign companies 
seek Mainland companies with which to do business so as to ease passage into the 
Chinese economy, they will find that this isn’t always a sure-fire bet for their joint 
operations to succeed: ‘...the episode showed that even well-connected Mainland 
partners can never fully protect the interests of foreign companies in Hong Kong, 
since there are bound to be people or groups in China more powerflil than that 
partner.’ (Allen, 1997, 233) This is also an example of how Beijing is not too keen 
for Mainland companies to compete against one another (e.g., CNAC did not start its 
own airline but bought CITIC’s shares in the established Dragonair airline) and will 
intervene to ensure the interests of its well-connected companies. Swire also agreed 
to sell more of its own share in Cathay to CITIC, in effect compensating CITIC to 
some extent for its loss in Dragonair. Now that CNAC controls Dragonair, there is 
the potential for it to expand its operations to compete directly with Cathay, which 
Swire still controls, on its routes. Swire would then have an interesting dilemma, 
either to willingly bow out and let Dragonair into these routes, or to directly compete. 
Were Swire to compete, it could come under pressure from Beijing, which would
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negatively affect its business. Were it to try and appease Beijing tlirough concessions 
to CNAC and Dragonair, it might gain some quid pro quo from Beijing for other 
business opportunities on the Mainland.
Other red chips also have a presence in essential industries in Hong Kong. 
The Hong Kong business activities of eleven major Chinese conglomerates are 
explained in detail in the appendix, which was created to show the vast extent to 
which Chinese companies have become involved in vital sectors and important 
companies in the territory’s economy. As is evidenced in the appendix, both China 
Telecom and China Everbright have minority shares in Hong Kong Telecom, CITIC 
Pacific owns 20% of China Light & Power, and China Resources, China Merchants, 
and COSCO all have interests in different container terminals. CITIC Pacific, when 
it purchased their stake in China Light and Power, bought the shares at a 3.1% 
discount on the open market price. (Ridding, Financial Times, 29 January 1997) 
Furthermore, CITIC owns 35% of the West Harbour tunnel, and China Merchants 
owns stakes in another tunnel system and an interstate in Hong Kong. As a separate 
take on the concept of ‘one country, two systems’, Chinese companies operating in 
Hong Kong are to abide by ‘one centre, two flanking sectors’. (HKCEA, 1995, 41) 
One centre refers to Hong Kong acting as the lifeblood of the growth of these Chinese 
companies, and two flanking sectors refers to the fact that these companies will 
continue to expand in both the Mainland and overseas economies, including Hong 
Kong.
In his significant work which applied a resource dependence explanation to 
transaction cost theory, Gilbert Wong emphasised, as in the transactions costs model, 
that firms will internalise those systems which provide a necessary product for the 
running of the company so as to reduce uncertainty in the supply of that product.
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‘Ihe resource dependence perspective postulates that organisations generally cannot 
generate all the resources the need internally and are dependent to varying degrees on 
resources supplied [externally]. Very often there are great uncertainties in the supply 
of those resources (e.g. financial capital, raw materials) that are critical for the 
survival of the company.’ (G. Wong, 1991, 126) One could expand this model and 
apply it at the level of the corporation, specifically as a compelling explanation for 
the desire of Chinese companies to ‘internalise’ certain Hong Kong businesses, such 
as shipping and finance, which are critical to their operations. Thus in order to secure 
the supply of a necessary resource or component of their businesses, Chinese 
companies seek to control, or to some extent become involved in, relevant sectors of 
the Hong Kong economy.
Red Chips and H shares
Mainland companies must request permission from the relevant authorities in 
Beijing before setting up operations in Hong Kong. The government wants to limit 
the number of Chinese companies in Hong Kong, not only to keep a watchful eye 
over Chinese corporate expansion, but also to artificially reduce competition amongst 
Chinese companies. Beijing is reluctant to have its Mainland companies compete, 
when they might be inadequately prepared to do so, and perhaps fail as a result. 
Accordingly, only a small proportion of the 500,000 large and medium SOEs has 
received permission from Beijing to operate in Hong Kong because the Chinese 
government wants to prevent crowding of the market. (Allen, 1997, 277)
Red chip is the term given to a Chinese-owned company (Chinese ownership 
is defined as a primary stake of at least 35%) which is listed on the SEHK and has 
operations in Hong Kong. The primary shareholders of these companies are either
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Chinese government ministries, provincial governments, or municipalities. So while 
both red chips and traditional SOEs are government controlled, red chips are large 
conglomerates which are listed on the SEHK and have business operations in Hong 
Kong. Red chip companies are at the forefront of the international orientation of 
China-based companies and are leading the way to Chinese economic expansion 
beyond Hong Kong. The aim of many Chinese companies is to become global, 
implementing modern operations and structure, and conducting business in Hong 
Kong or listing on the SEHK are steps in this process. Chinese companies doing 
business in Hong Kong are helping to promote China’s economic development as 
they acquire economic information, capital, and managerial experience to channel 
back to the Mainland.
In July 1992 the Joint Group of Securities Affairs for Hong Kong and the 
Mainland was formed to study the possibilities of Mainland companies listing on the 
SEHK. The SEHK and the Chinese government have worked together to make it 
possible for Chinese companies to list on the SEHK, and as a result of this 
cooperation they have established regulations to which Chinese companies must 
adhere if they are to list on the Exchange. These regulations stipulate that companies 
listing in Hong Kong must conform to international and/or Hong Kong accounting 
standards. Some Mainland companies also list in London, New York, and Singapore, 
but the SEHK is their primary bourse and their most important source of funding: the 
value of red chips and H shares share floatations on the SEHK in the first eight 
months of 1997 totaled more than US$4.2 billion. (Ridding, Financial Times, 27 
October 1997)
Chinese companies also must meet the requirements set forth by the Securities 
Commission in Hong Kong and the China Securities Regulatoiy Commission in
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China before they are allowed to list on the SEHK. If a Mainland company wishes to 
raise capital on the stock exchange, they must list via an IPO, because backdoor 
listings, in which shares in a shell company are swapped for assets from the Mainland 
company, have been banned theoretically by China. Red chips cannot diversify from 
their main business or raise new capital within six months of listing.
The first two Mainland companies to be listed on the SEHK were Guangdong 
Investment and Min Xin Holdings in 1987. Early on, backdoor listings were a 
popular way for Chinese companies to list on the SEHK. By acquiring a shell 
company already listed on the SEHK, and then transferring assets to this ‘front’ 
company, Chinese enterprises were able to circumvent many of the regulations that 
an IPO might have meant. Backdoor listings were favoured by Mainland companies 
because they were generally faster than the IPO process. Chinese enterprises 
purchased 19 shell companies in 1992 and 1993. (Fung, 1997, 94) In May 1993 the 
SEHK and the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong issued guidelines 
on backdoor listings which were intended to crack down on these listings. If the 
listed company changes the nature of its business as a result of acquisition, then it 
could be considered in violation of these guidelines and the issuer of the shares may 
be treated as a new applicant for listing. These guidelines also require companies 
who purchase shell companies must provide written notification of the present and 
future proposed activities of the listed company and outlining plans for asset 
injections or sales.
In the second half of 1992, there was a large increase in the number of red 
chip IPOs. These were mostly companies already operating in Hong Kong which 
hoped a public listing would boost their flinding. Guangzhou Investment, China 
Travel, and China Merchants were the first Mainland companies to go public via an
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IPO. Because of the success of the listing of these red chips, other Mainland 
companies sought to raise money tlirough the SEHK as well. According to statistics 
published by Goldman Sachs, red chips account for 9.65% of the SEHK market 
capitalisation. (Goldman Sachs, 1997)
Red chip companies, because of the nature of their ownership, are targeted by 
investors because they have access to Mainland assets at lower-than-market value, 
and/or because they may be granted special franchises by the Chinese government. 
The valuation of SOEs is veiy much dependent upon the quality of the assets under 
its control. In order to improve the viability of SOEs as well as to lure investors, 
state-owned assets, such as power plants and toll roads, are turned over to the 
business arm of the government agency who controls these assets. These assets are 
then supposed to provide a revenue base as well as attract investment. Because 
foreign investors are not permitted to invest directly in certain sectors in China, it is 
necessary for foreigners who would like to take advantage of growth in strategic 
industries in China such as infrastmcture and energy to invest in the red chips which 
are involved in these sectors. The value of their shares derives principally from the 
significance of their connections on the Mainland and ‘their potential to exploit China 
earnings’. (Goldman Sachs, 1997, 7) Thus their share price is largely speculative 
driven: as an example, Goldman Sachs notes the case of CITIC Pacific, the largest 
red chip, whose share price declined when CITIC Beijing reduced its stake in the 
company. It was thought that this move would reduce CITIC Pacific’s more 
important connections on the Mainland. Many analysts believe that the increasing 
interest in red chips and H shares is driven by liquidity from the Mainland, although 
there are no official statistics to support this. They believe that the increase in 
investment from retail investors is driven by Chinese investors who may have access
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to information about political or economic situations of Chinese companies. The 
fluctuating shai e prices of red chips have been attributed to the extent to which news 
and rumours affect these stocks. Because these companies are politically backed, any 
government actions or political plays in China will more directly affect these 
companies than companies with no ties to their national government. The dramatic 
increase in market share of red chips and H shares, from 10% in November 1996 to 
28% in July 1997 shows the strong demand for China-related stocks as well as the 
strong desire of Mainland companies to gain access to capital markets. The share 
price of Beijing Enterprises, the corporate representative of the Beijing municipal 
government, tripled in value in one month after its initial offering was 1,276 times 
oversubscribed. (Martin, Financial Times, 16 June 1997) Were Chinese companies 
to lose value, perhaps due to a reduction of the value of Mainland assets, this would 
have a substantial negative effect on the entire stock exchange. Red chips indeed 
have suffered in the recent East Asian economic crisis. In October 1997, when the 
crisis hit Hong Kong, the red chip index fell by 40%, contributing to the overall crisis 
in the SEHK, which fell to a six-month low that same month. (Ridding, Financial 
Times, 22 October 1997)
H shares are also Chinese-owned companies listed on the SEHK, but H share 
companies’ operations exist solely on the Mainland. H shares are more closely 
associated with traditional SOEs which are still very much dependent upon the state. 
H shares are typically smaller and a weaker management, and they tend to focus on 
only one sector, while red chips have diversified interests and are looking to expand 
beyond the Chinese market. As of September 1997 there were 32 H shares. Because 
their businesses are entirely within China, they have been hit hard by high inflation 
and China’s attempts to reign in the economy. As a result of these factors and the
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weaker management, H shares n^ve net performed as well as red chips and are 
consequently considered to be not as good an investment as the red chips. The H 
shares are thus valued lower on the exchange and are considered larger risks. Despite 
these negatives, H shares are anxious to raise money through the Hong Kong market, 
and there are at least 40 new H share companies wanting to list.
Red chips are considered better investments than other Chinese-investment 
stocks open to foreigners, including those listed on the Chinese stock exchanges, for a 
number of reasons. While they receive quality asset injections from their controlling 
owners, their business outlook encompasses opportunities beyond the mainland, 
specifically in Hong Kong, which reduces risk and makes for strong growth potential. 
Very often their owners are primary state agencies, which have more clout in China’s 
political system than secondary agencies or municipal governments. The red chips 
also do not share many of the characteristics of SOEs in that they have relatively 
more freedom in their operational policies and are more transparent in terms of their 
accounting and legal practices.
The Red Chip companies
The following red chip companies have been highlighted to illustrate the 
expansion of official Chinese investment in Hong Kong, with the implication that 
more Chinese investment in the territory over the coming years should be expected. 
The appendix provides a more in depth survey of the activity of Chinese companies. 
The Bank of China, China Resources Holdings, China Merchants International, and 
China Travel Services (HK) were the first Chinese companies to locate branches in 
Hong Kong, and were the four largest investors until the late 1980s. Mainland 
conglomerates are moving into virtually every sector of the Hong Kong economy.
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and the red chips act as their listing velncies, windows to the capitalist market for 
these Mainland enterprises. The largest red chip is CITIC Pacific, which has a market 
capitalisation of over HK$90 billion. It is the ninth-largest listed company in Hong 
Kong. It is majority owned by CITIC (Hong Kong), and management owns another 
21%, exemplifying a western ownership strategy. CITIC owns a 20% stake in China 
Light & Power, the main electricity provider for the territory. It also owns a 25% 
stake in Cathay Pacific and a 28.5% stake in Dragonair, the two Hong Kong-based 
airlines. CITIC Pacific also has extensive interests in property and infrastructure, 
including terminals in Hong Kong’s underground. Larry Yung, son of China’s Vice 
President, Rong Yiren, ains CITIC Pacific. CITIC Pacific first listed in August 1991, 
and its shares rose 67% in 1996, outpacing the 33% rise in the Hang Seng index of 
leading Hong Kong stocks. (‘HK Executives.. .’, The New York Times, 1996)
China Merchants Holdings is a large conglomerate, with investments 
primarily in infrastmcture and shipping. It was first listed in 1992 and is under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Communications. China Merchants now has over 530 
subsidiaries, including Union Bank in Hong Kong, as well as operating the largest 
barge fleet in Hong Kong and one of China’s largest ocean fleets.
China Resources Enterprise (CRE) is the flagship company of China 
Resources Holdings which is controlled by Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (MOFTEC). CRE is the second largest red chip behind CITIC Pacific. 
Its interests include property, a Chinese brewery, and warehouse and storage 
facilities. China Resources Holdings was established in Hong Kong in 1949 by 
MOFTEC, and now has more than 500 subsidiaries.
China Travel International Investment (Hong Kong) (CTII) has interests in, 
but not exclusive to, tourism, hotels, and infrastmcture. CTII is 60% owned by China
1 0 0
Travel Service (CTS), v^hicli reports to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, a 
ministiy-level department reporting directly to the State Council. CTII is the largest 
of China Travel’s listed ventures. China Travel has a virtual monopoly on tourism in 
China, and is also the largest travel operator in Hong Kong. It has the sole right to 
handle tourist visas to China. CTII is also one of two agents authorised to handle 
railroad cargo between China and Hong Kong.
Virtually all provinces, as well as numerous cities and the SEZs, have 
corporate representation which have listed vehicles on the SEHK. Fujian province’s 
window company, Fujian Investment and Enterprise Corporation, controls the listed 
vehicle Min Xin. Guangdong’s listed vehicle is Guangdong Investments, which has 
interests in various manufacturing enterprises. Shum Yip Investment Ltd. is the 
window company for Shenzhen Economic Zone, and its primary interests are in 
infrastructure and property investments in China. Shanghai Industrial Holdings is the 
window company of the Shanghai municipal government; it was first listed in 1996 
but already is the third largest red chip as its share price has risen over 450%. The 
company has investments in infrastmcture, manufacturing, and retailing.
Many of these red chips are acting as the sole representative of China in 
dealing with Hong Kong and foreign companies in certain areas of business. 
Increasingly, however, as more and more Chinese companies move into Hong Kong, 
the traditional red chips will find native competition for their businesses areas and 
access to China. As the original Chinese companies in Hong Kong enjoyed a virtual 
monopoly on their business in China, stock listing was not a priority, but for new 
Chinese businesses that must find a way of competing, issuing shares has become 
vital to raise funds to expand their operations.
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Not only are Chinese companies going to inevitably affect the market in Hong 
Kong, but Mainland businesses have adopted certain capitalist methods to operate in 
the international market. The HKCEA itself realises the necessity of attracting funds 
by emphasising efficiency and competitiveness in its member companies through the 
medium of issuing shares, by which ‘the enterprise can be remolded (sic) after a share 
company, and this is benefitial (sic) to the change-over of the operational mechanism, 
to the stmctural readjustment and to the strengthening of the market over the 
enterprise.’ (HKCEA Annual Report, 1995, 18) By choosing to do business in Hong 
Kong, Mainland businesses will be forced to compete against global capitalist 
corporations. Thus by doing so they themselves will evolve, and in the process 
encourage the evolution of business practices within China,
China’s relationship w ith red chips
The HKCEA is enthusiastic about transforming enterprises into shareholding 
corporations, for they realise the benefits of making the company more responsive to 
the market, not only for the strengthening of the Chinese economy but to also attract 
funds from discerning investors. They advocate stock market listing to encourage 
‘stmctural readjustment’ and ‘strengthening of the market over the enterprise’. 
(HKCEA Annual Report, 1995, 18) Red chips enjoy support from China in that they 
bring in needed funds, which B shares and H shares, nor for that matter A shares and 
other internal investments, cannot do alone. Red chips also offer another alternative 
for the excess liquidity in China which is destined for the stock markets. Investment 
in red chips can alleviate some of the pressure on the domestic A shares in China.
However, although red chip companies enjoy the support of the Chinese 
government, China has actually worked to slow the expansion of the red chips, as the
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red chips control state assets which the government does not want squandered. 
Exorbitant share prices and more flmds at the disposal of these companies overheat 
China’s economy through increased liquidity and inflation. As stated before, one of 
China’s main goals is to keep inflation under control. With the aim of controlling 
speculative investment in red chips, the Mainland government introduced rules on 20 
June 1997 which are designed to regulate more stringently the listing of red chip 
companies and to make sure those companies that do list are structurally sound. By 
hopefully limiting the number of companies that list, China is exerting some control 
over the market exposure of Chinese companies. Regulations set forth by China aim 
to monitor the red chip phenomenon to make sure listed companies continue to serve 
the purposes of the Chinese government regarding the economy. Transfers of 
domestic assets to red chips must have the approval from the relevant government 
authorities and the China Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC), and red chips 
may only spin off subsidiaides with a solid tliree-year record.
As red chips are the corporate arms of government agencies, they are money­
making vehicles for the government as well, and it is important to the government to 
see these companies succeed. These poweidlil branches of the government will want 
to ensure that their corporate extensions perform well. Connections are all-important 
in China, so those companies which have impeccable government ties will be well 
placed to receive favourable government treatment, lucrative government business 
contracts, important state asset injections, and considerable investor interest. By 
viewing Hong Kong as a way for Mainland companies to raise capital, Beijing very 
clearly sees the Hong Kong economy as an environment in which Mainland 
companies can and should be successful.
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Issues o f  C h inese com pan y activ ity  in H on g  K on g
Chinese companies continue to treat Hong Kong as the capitalist window to 
then* own Mainland market, a role which Hong Kong itself has cultivated. Hong 
Kong has become a highly important base for the operations of many Chinese 
conglomerates, and the Chinese government, which backs Chinese companies, have a 
vested interest in attracting international capital to Hong Kong. Jamie Allen puts it 
bluntly when he says, ‘(h)urting Hong Kong would directly harm the interests of 
China’s largest and most successful state-owned enterprises.’ (Allen, 1997, 200) 
However, China is experiencing growing pains due to a move to a more market- 
oriented economy, and Chinese companies themselves will inevitably be affected, 
which would have knock-on effects to their operations in Hong Kong. This is 
particularly critical for the Hong Kong economy as Chinese businesses move into 
vital industries in Hong Kong. As China is a developing country with a government 
preoccupied with maintaining control, there is the danger that China could impose 
capital controls in an attempt to restrict unofficial outflows. Because China faces 
some of the biggest development challenges in the world as its socialist economy 
implements market reforms, its companies face more dangers in terms of stability and 
economic constraints than companies from countries with long-established market 
traditions. Furthermore, these companies are state-owned, which means they lack the 
independence of decision-making, and business strategy is often synonymous with 
government interest. The dynamic of state-backed Chinese investment will 
compromise Hong Kong’s economic autonomy. Chinese officials, both businessmen 
and politicians, have the ‘dual identities of policy-makers in China and profit-seekers 
in Hong Kong’. (Chan, 1995, 949) As the hongs (the big British banlcs and trading
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companies) are leaving and British companies are being taken over by Chinese 
interests, the Beijing-backed Hong Kong government is left without a serious 
countervailing power. (Hicks, 1987,34)
Many analysts have concluded that well-connected Chinese companies have 
an advantage and will be vital partners for any foreign company with designs on 
moving into the Mainland market: ‘(t)he assumption is already widespread that
companies with close political ties in China will flourish (in Hong Kong).’ (Chen, 
Wall Sti^eet Journal, 29 November 1996) Both foreign and Hong Kong companies 
are anxious to cultivate ties with Chinese companies in the territoiy in order to open 
up business opportunities on the Mainland. This is illustrated tlnough the example of 
the New China Hong Kong Group company, set up by a Hong Kong businessman, 
whose shareholders included 13 Chinese government firms, eleven of which were 
connected to the national government. (Chan, 1995, 950) With such powerful allies 
on his side, such a well-connected businessman would be advantageously situated to 
procure business in China. Companies in Hong Kong with good Chinese connections 
are considered good investments; conversely, a company’s shares could suffer if a 
Chinese partner withdrew. This was the case when CITIC Pacific reduced its holding 
in Hongkong Telecom from 10% to 8% in 1996. Hongkong Telecom shares fell by 
3.1% after the sale, and analysts believed that Cable and Wireless, which then owned 
58% of the company, would attempt to find another Mainland investor. (Lucas, 
Financial Times)
Directors of Mainland companies operating in Hong Kong must avoid the 
temptation to abuse the power they wield over access to the Mainland economy. For 
a foreign company to open up operations on the Mainland, it is necessary to form a 
joint venture with a Mainland company, and the corporate arms of the Chinese
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government monopolize access to certain geographical regions, at the provincial 
level, or particular sectors, at the ministry level. Because foreign companies use 
Hong Kong to enter the Chinese market, Chinese companies have enormous influence 
in the ‘semi-autonomous region’ which is supposed to be separate from China. How 
Chinese influence in the teiritoiy will affect Hong Kong’s integrity and consequently 
investor confidence is the subject of the succeeding chapter. China has invariably 
used Hong Kong to augment its own economy, especially with increasing 
concentration after the signing of the Joint Declaration. China’s use of the city is not 
without consequences for the independence of the territory’s economy.
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VII. Implications of China’s involvement in the H ong Kong
economy
Subtly, China is changing the economic environment in Hong Kong. 
According to statements by Chinese officials and the activity of Chinese companies, 
Hong Kong’s utility is defined as its ability to raise capital for China, The unique 
circumstances of Hong Kong’s status as a Special Administrative Region within 
China poses certain problems for the tenitory that could ultimately jeopardise its 
standing as the paragon of a free market economy. There are a number issues which 
have the potential to disturb investor confidence and consequently undermine Hong 
Kong’s role as a financial centre. These issues stem from the tensions that exist for a 
capitalist enclave operating under the auspices of a socialist government.
The case of China’s government-owned companies in Hong Kong embodies 
these tensions between state-directed planning and free-market economics. Because 
of the vital differences Chinese companies have from other foreign companies 
operating in Hong Kong (which were explained in the previous chapter), there exists 
the potential for conuption, conflict of interest, self-censorship, and the abuse of 
guanxi in the attempt to secure relationships with Chinese companies. These dangers 
are paiticulaiiy acute because Chinese government-owned companies are heavily 
involved in important industries in Hong Kong, industries upon which the Hong 
Kong economy is based such as banldng and shipping.
The opportunities for exploitation of the power wielded by the Chinese 
government and their businesses is the subject of this chapter. Hong Kong needs not 
necessarily lose its level playing field, but it will take some deft handling of its 
relationship with the Mainland to maintain its economic autonomy. If China’s policy 
is to use the Hong Kong economy, both China and Hong Kong have a responsibility
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to make sure it is used conscientiously so that its autonomy is not compromised, 
because it is Hong Kong’s economic independence from the Mainland which inspires 
investor confidence.
Conflict of interest
As we have seen from the previous chapter, Chinese companies are moving 
into Hong Kong in ever increasing numbers and are active in important industries in 
the territoiy. As these companies are government owned, they are either directed by 
or have significant connections with officials who form government policy. A 
conflict of interest arises as Chinese government officials who are responsible for 
formulating Chinese government policy which affects Hong Kong are also concerned 
with making money out of the territory. Certain Mainland policy actions could have 
a direct impact upon the Hong Kong economy, such as taxing certain transactions or 
liberalising the banking sector in China, and officials privy to such information might 
have insider knowledge for their private business activity and investments in the stock 
market in Hong Kong. There is also a moral hazard issue in which directors of 
Chinese enterprises, because the companies are backed by the government, take 
greater investment risks, which can lead to ‘property market and stock market 
speculations that are not consistent with market risks’ as well as excessive volatility. 
(Fung, 1997, 95) Perhaps, too, foreigners who have invested in Mainland companies 
may feel that if the government is willing to cover the losses of government-owned 
enterprises tlnough funding and ‘soft’ loans, then their investments are somewhat 
insured. (Fung, 1997, 95-96)
108
Guanxi
Guanxi, the Chinese term for connections, is the driving force behind Chinese 
business deals. Because of these connections, either with other business people or 
with government officials, businesses more easily acquire materials needed for their 
operations, secure lucrative contracts, or participate in business activities that for all 
other intents and purposes are classified as illegal by Beijing. It is crucial for foreign 
companies to have the right connections in order to get thiough the bureaucratic red 
tape of doing business in China. Companies seeking to do business in provinces or 
cities must go tln ough lower-level cadres to gain the necessary permission, and thus 
lesser government officials are in a position to demand concessions.
There is the concern that Chinese businesses will be granted special deals and 
contracts in Hong Kong as the territoiy’s companies bid to secure the right guanxi. In 
a quid pro quo relationship, it is then hoped that these Chinese companies can then 
give Hong Kong businesses an ‘in’ to the China market. Investors aie concerned 
about the permeation of conuption in the territory as Chinese contacts are sought. It 
is not an uncommon business practice for payments or gifts to be given to Chinese 
companies to woo potential business partners. The Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) estimated in 1991 that the cash and gifts paid to Mainland firms to 
facilitate business transactions in China added between three and five percent to 
business operating costs. (Yahuda, 1996, 129) As Hong Kong and foreign 
companies move to make deals with Chinese businesses, Hong Kong can get dragged 
into these business practices. Many worry that the courts will be inhibited from 
deciding against politically well-connected Chinese. (Yahuda, 1996, 130) These 
fears were confirmed when in March 1998 Hong Kong’s top legal official decided not 
to prosecute a newspaper publisher who was a member of one of China’s political
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bodies for fraud, and in a separate case the government did not prosecute Xinhua for 
violating Hong Kong’s privacy statute. (Landler, New York Times, 31 March 1998)
As discussed in Chapter 2 with regard to China’ policy of forming a united 
front, China is courting Hong Kong businesspeople to maintain powerful allies in the 
teiTitory. The Better Hong Kong Foundation (BHKF) is a non-profit group set up in 
1996 by several Hong Kong businesspeople, many of them billionaires, who ‘have a 
huge stake in protecting their fortunes by getting along with their future rulers. ’ 
(Greenberger and Stein, Wall Street Journal, 3 March 1997) All of the trustees of the 
BHKF have been appointed by China to be Hong Kong Affairs Advisors, an informal 
role in which they are expected to advise China on Hong Kong issues. The BHKF is 
spending millions on public relations and lobbying to project a positive image of 
China and Hong Kong around the world, very simply because its members’ fortunes 
are heavily invested in these two economies. The 21 trustees of the BHKF are some 
of the most important actors in the Hong Kong economy; they also have partnerships 
with Chinese industries and have developed extensive business interests in China. 
Together the 21 tmstees have investments in Hong Kong valued at about US$80 
billion. (Greenberger and Stein, Wall Street Journal, 3 March 1997) However, it is 
interesting to note that a member of the BHKF, Li Ka-shing, who owns Cheung Kong 
Holdings, the third largest land company in the territoiy, has put his family’s tmst in 
the Caribbean.
The members of the BHKF and other businesspeople are anxious to curry 
favour with Beijing. They realise that if Hong Kong were seen as a threat to the 
Chinese government, a clampdown would mean a huge threat to their businesses and 
the freedom they currently enjoy. This acquiescence is troubling, however, as 
formerly, business could be conducted in Hong Kong with guaranteed freedom and
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virtually no interference from the government. Tliis reality of no government 
involvement meant that the market was the sole means of competition. We already 
see a trend in the other direction, where Chinese government influence in Hong Kong 
is pervasive to an extent not delineated in the Basic Law nor reflected in Hong 
Kong’s claims to be ‘independent’ in their operations from China. When this 
influence is manipulated for economic gain, the level playing field is undermined.
Corruption
Corruption as a result of seeking contacts with Chinese companies in an 
illegal manner and black-market activities is a threat to the Hong Kong economy, but 
ICAC, which was established in 1972 by the governor, has been instrumental in 
minimising this thieat. Its mandate is to help maintain a clear, level playing field in 
Hong Kong. Chinese firms operating in Hong Kong come under the scrutiny of 
ICAC, although ICAC has never published its detailed findings regarding China- 
related firms. (Yahuda, 1996, 129) As an offshore centre for Chinese capital, there 
are undoubtedly illegal funds passing through Hong Kong financial institutions which 
are attempting to evade the jurisdiction of Chinese officials. Cormption is the result 
of the exploitation of the gap between socialist and capitalist economies, such as the 
smuggling and black-market transactions which take place in the waters surrounding 
Hong Kong.
Fair, open trade practices are at the core of Hong Kong’s reputation as a 
member of the WTO. Re-exports from China through Hong Kong have already fallen 
afoul of fair trading practices as established by the WTO as seen in the trade disputes 
the U.S. has had with the territoiy. Both Hong Kong and China have quotas on their 
imports of clothing into the U.S. However, Hong Kong’s quotas are undemsed; this
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creates a loophole which enterprising Chinese and Hong Kong businesspeople have 
taken advantage of. China ships clothing to Hong Kong factories, which then sew 
‘Made in Hong Kong’ labels into the clothing, which are then shipped to the U.S. 
Interestingly, Hong Kong’s textile work force has declined by two-thirds in the last 
decade, while its exports are up by almost 50%, according to Hong Kong government 
data. The government of Hong Kong is not impervious to skirting the law—one of the 
members of the Executive Council has been fined by Britain for the illegal exporting 
of goods originating elsewhere, and has been investigated for similar charges by the 
U.S. authorities. (Bonner, New York Times, 1 April 1997)
Censorship
Acquiescence by the business community is directly related to the issue of 
self-censorship in Hong Kong’s media. Investor confidence is an intangible quantity 
which could make or break the territory’s reputation as an international financial 
centre. Tliis confidence is partly based on open communications and a free press with 
the free-flow of information. Lu Ping, head of the Chinese government Hong Kong 
and Macao Affairs Office, claimed before the handover that the press had to be 
patriotic, otheiwise it would be regulated by laws. Tung Chee Hwa has announced 
that some reports on Tibet and Taiwan as well as personal criticisms of Chinese 
officials are offlimits. Although China has promised thiough the Basic Law to 
continue freedoms such as free speech in Hong Kong, the established journalistic 
parameters are infringed by a pervasive form of self-censorship in the territory. Hong 
Kong journalist, academics, and businesspeople are steering clear of any criticisms of 
China, partially because it is rumoured that China keeps a list of ‘troublemakers’ in 
the territoiy, and very few individuals or organisations wish to be labelled as
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subversive by the Chinese government. Only a few select individuals outspoken in 
their demand for democratic reforms, whereas business groups and the media are 
participating in a form of self-censorship that is very rarely critical of Chinese 
policies. Overall Hong Kongers wish to smooth the way for good relations with 
China and subsequently good business deals with Chinese companies. Star TV, 
which is controlled by the Rupert Murdoch empire and is actively pursuing the 
Chinese television maiicet, dropped BBC news from its programming when Beijing 
became offended by a BBC documentary on Mao Tse Tung. (Ching, 1997, 64) The 
worry is that as the free-flow of information is restricted, there are dangers for the 
transparency and freedom of commerce. A stake in Giordano Intl. Ltd., a Hong Kong 
clothing store, was sold to five Chinese companies in order to overcome official 
resistance to its expansion on the Mainland. Giordano has been thwarted from 
opening new shops in China for three years ever since an article critical of the then 
Chinese premier was published in Next magazine, which is owned by Giordano’s 
founder, Jimmy Lai. To help Giordano’s expansion, Jimmy Lai resigned from the 
board of Giordano. {International Herald Tribune, 15-16 March 1997)
Leaving the territoiy
Loss of confidence in Hong Kong manifests itself in different ways, all of 
which are harmfril to the future dynamism of the territoiy. The emigration 
phenomenon has been documented, but also as devastating is the exit of capital and 
companies from the territoiy. This exodus is due to companies opting for reduction 
of exposure to risk, primarily attributable to the uncertainty over the friture of the 
tenitory.
Evidence of emigration from Hong Kong and a possible ‘brain diain’ is detailed in Skeldon, 1994, 
pages 3-18,21-51, and 325-332.
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Repatriation of capital is done for a variety of reasons, including to avoid 
direct taxation of these assets, to avoid types of ‘taxation’ on these assets in the form 
of high domestic inflation, and to avoid political and social um*est in a territory, which 
may undermine the value of their assets vis-à-vis other currencies due to an unstable 
exchange rate or again, high inflation. Capital flight is also attributed to low real 
interest rates (due to hyperinflation), repressive tax systems, and large fiscal deficits. 
John Cuddington, in his seminal work on capital flight in the early 1980s, defined it 
as short-term speculative capital outflows responding to political or financial crises. 
(Cuddington, 1983, 2) The concern over the fliture of the territoiy was revealed in a 
recent opinion poll in the Far Eastern Economic Review that showed that 23% of 
those surveyed claimed that more than half their savings had already been removed to 
foreign investments. (Royle, Scotland on Sunday, 16 Febmary 1997) Hong Kong, 
while conditions as defined above for capital flight are virtually non-existent, is 
controlled by a developing country that does fill many of the prerequisites for capital 
flight. Thus, capital flight may be relevant to Hong Kong in terms of imported risk.
Half of Hong Kong’s top 200 corporations have their company registration 
outside of the tenitoiy, and more than half of the companies listed on the SEHK have 
their headquarters outside of Hong Kong. (Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996, 68) A 
poll conducted before the handover revealed that 59% of all the colony’s companies 
are already listed overseas. (Royle, Scotland on Sunday, 16 February 1997) 
Businesspeople know that under cuijent conditions in Hong Kong, where there are no 
controls on capital flows in and out of the territoiy, they could easily transfer their 
capital out of Hong Kong, and if favourable conditions remained, they could transfer 
their money back as easily and quickly:
Most inultiiiational corporations have been careful to Ihnit Üieir investments in Hong 
Kong to a small proportion of tlieir overall international investments and could 
readily transfer tlie investment elsewhere if tire risk seemed proliibitive or tlie profits
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iinatli'active. The ovenvheliiiing majoi% of Hong Kong’s business people have 
foreign passports and a large number of tire important local firms have established a 
right to foreign domicile. (Yaliuda, 1996,123-124)
The local and foreign business community in Hong Kong is already protected against 
uncertainty concerning the future of the ten itory, as they have calculated the risks and 
have hedged thek bets accordingly. Those that are risk-averse will prefer to send 
their capital to more stable environments, as opposed to being exposed to volatility 
caused by posturing by China. By moving their company headquarters elsewhere, 
companies are prepared should China jeopardise Hong Kong’s economic system.
An interesting example of capital repatriation is Jardine Matheson and Co., 
the original hong, which moved its financial domicile from Hong Kong to Bermuda 
in 1984 and re-incorporated itself there. It is also no longer listed on the Hong Kong 
stock exchange. Another such example is the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC), which moved its headquarters to London in the past few years. 
It was done, it was claimed, because the HSBC took over Midland Bank, a British- 
based bank, and the Banlc of England required a transfer of headquarters. However, 
some analysts pointed out that this was a convenient way for the company to move its 
financial domicile from Hong Kong before the handover. The only British merchant 
house to retain its financial base in Hong Kong is Swire Pacific Ltd., which is, 
nevertheless, decreasing its presence in Hong Kong, most notably through the sale of 
a major stake of the flagship airline for Hong Kong, Cathay Pacific, to China in April 
1996. Chinese investment seems to be increasing in Hong Kong, and indeed, taking 
the place of ‘foreign’ investment in the territory. The implication is that Chinese 
businesses bring with them Chinese businesspeople, and the atmosphere in the 
territory will become more and more pro-China as they assume positions of power in 
the Hong Kong economy.
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Maintaining power
The primary argument for continued confidence in Hong Kong is the idea that 
China will not lull the goose that lays the golden egg. That is to say, China benefits 
greatly from the economic success of Hong Kong in teims of the investment that is 
channelled through the territory, the increasing market for Chinese goods as Hong 
Kong peoples’ incomes increase, and the entrepot role Hong Kong plays for Chinese 
goods. If China were to jeopardise Hong Kong’s success by heavy-handedness or 
through political and thus economic suppression, then China in turn might jeopardise 
its own economic growth by tlireatening investment funds and mai'kets for its exports. 
Hong Kong is the main source of foreign exchange for China as a result of the trade 
that is conducted with China in a wide variety of goods from all over the world. 
China would be doing itself a disservice were it to cut off the market and economic 
viability of the tenitory.
These considerations govern China’s policy toward Hong Kong, although 
China has shown that it is not reluctant to take actions to affirm its authority. The 
cliched argument that China will not harm the goose that lays the gold egg has little 
relevance for a Chinese government which will try and maintain its own power at all 
costs. As the ailing power, China has reserved for itself final say on all matters in 
Hong Kong. China emphasises control first and foremost, which is echoed in the 
statements of Chinese leaders and in the actions of the Chinese government not only 
with Hong Kong, but also with situations such as Taiwan. China conducted military 
exercises in the Taiwan Strait when Taiwan went ahead with democratic presidential 
elections. This manoeuvre emphasises that China still maintains a very strong one 
China policy and is anxious to make both Taiwan and Hong Kong an integral part of
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China once again. This is also exemplified in China’s decision to replace Hong 
Kong’s elected legislature with one indirectly appointed by Beijing once the handover 
had occurred:
(T)o die extent tliat Cliina is more concerned ’witli social stability and economic 
prosperity than political imiovation, democratization in tlie form of mass volatility, 
group activism, and partisan and adversarial politics would render China’s ultimate 
control much more difficult Üian a situation in wliich tlie bureaucratic government is 
stronger tlian the society. Otliei’wise, tlie Cliinese govenmient might be tempted into 
a visible and preemptive role in Hong Kong’s political struggle, tliereby tlueatening 
stability and prosperity. (Kuan and Lau, 1987,106)
China considers stability and sovereignty paramount to economic concerns. Thus
China is willing to take risks which may unsettle the economy in order to preserve
stability and its sovereignty; but crucially, it will be always be conscious of the affect
its actions will have on its own, and therefore by inference Hong Kong’s, markets and
will be sure not to irrevocably damage investor confidence or the strengthening of its
economy. Paradoxically, it is a strong economy which undergirds stability and
goodwill toward the government; thus China has an awareness of the limits to which
it can test economic resilience.
China in transition
As a developing countiy, China is subject to internal strains which will 
undoubtedly affect Hong Kong. China is changing from a socialist, centrally led 
economic system to a market economy and is rapidly modernising as well. Countries 
and companies are competing to supply the enormous Chinese market and the 
growing middle class of consumers the market reforms are producing. This 
competition for investment seems to be very forgiving, in that businesspeople will not 
let political tensions interfere with the economic opportunities for investment in 
China.
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Maintaining Hong Kong as a semi-autonomous region will take some adept 
political handling on the part of Beijing. As China transforms its state-owned 
enterprises and its banking and financial sector, it will rely heavily on investment 
support and expertise from Hong Kong. At the same time, China seeks to contain 
Hong Kong: ‘...as an agent of modernity and marketisation Hong Kong also
constitutes a challenge to the traditional command economy and to the centres of 
administrative and ideological authority of the communist-led state.’ (Yahuda, 1996, 
22) If people in China recognise that those in Hong Kong enjoy freedoms that they 
themselves do not enjoy, it will be hard to justify China’s toleration of the enclave 
amongst its own restrictive Mainland policies. There are already income disparity 
tensions between the wealthy coastal areas and the poor inland rural areas which have 
yet to feel the full effects of investment and market reform. These tensions can only 
be accentuated by a rich Hong Kong, and will force more reforms in the loiral areas to 
encourage investment there.
Conclusion
China seeks to use Hong Kong as a tool for its own growth and development 
and to influence to some extent the direction of growth of Hong Kong, so that China 
can channel international investment funds tlirough Hong Kong into much needed 
development projects in China. Chinese companies, especially, are keen to use the 
territory as an outlet for the expansion of their operations. On the other hand, Hong 
Kong and other foreign interests have felt less sure about their future in Hong Kong, 
and have been realigning their investments to hedge their bets against a future 
downturn in the tenitory caused by imported risk from China, an increase in 
connption, or a mishandling of the territoiy by China. Hong Kong may be affected in
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the future by turmoil in China, and it is difficult to say whether or not connections in 
China will protect businesspeople. The future of Hong Kong is tied with the future 
prosperity of China’s economy, and the two economies will only further integrate as 
more Chinese investors move into the territory and as Hong Kong businesses invest 
in China. Because of the benefits China derives from having an international 
financial centre on its doorstep, China has a vested interest in maintaining the 
capitalist mechanisms in the territoiy which attract foreign businesses. However, 
China’s very involvement in Hong Kong threatens to undermine the market which it 
depends upon to further the growth of the national economy. Difficulties arise 
because of the extensive integration of the two economies: China’s development
problems have the potential to affect the Hong Kong economy via cross-border 
investments and trade. Furthermore, government-owned Chinese companies have 
special connections on the Mainland which confer on them a disproportionate amount 
of power relative to other businesses or interest groups in Hong Kong. Because of 
Hong Kong’s relationship dynamic with China as business outlet and protectorate, 
there is the potential for the loss of Hong Kong’s reputation as a free, open market. 
The Chinese government ministries have huge corporate representation in Hong 
Kong, which automatically gives the Chinese government an exposure and an 
influence in Hong Kong on which the Basic Law remains conspicuously silent.
The short-term economic stability in Hong Kong is undermined by the 
political uncertainty. Not only has Hong Kong changed regimes, but it is under the 
control of a socialist-orientated and authoritarian government. China’s policy toward 
the territory will continue to be governed by the economic relationship between the 
two entities as well as Hong Kong’s rapport with foreign investors. In order to 
inspire confidence in Hong Kong, it will need to be perceived by the international
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community as having autonomy from Beijing. Investors want to see that Hong 
Kong’s efficient system where transactions are governed by the market is in direct 
contrast to China’s cumbersome bureaucracy which is informed by guanxi. 
Strengthening of Hong Kong’s own government and the maintaining the integrity of 
the rule of law will go a long way toward giving Hong Kong its own international 
identity separate from that of just another southern Chinese city.
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VIII. Conclusion
There are immense economic implications of political change, and Hong 
Kong’s new mling power adds a new dimension to the territory’s economic 
operations. Although the Hong Kong and Chinese economies have been integrating 
for the past twenty years, the 1997 handover marked a new beginning for Hong Kong 
in which it would be directly responsible to China. Hong Kong has not remained 
unchanged from China’s use of its economy, and now serves as the arena for Chinese 
companies to raise capital for their operations and to expand their businesses. Hong 
Kong’s economy will continue to evolve as China continues to use the capitalist 
enclave to service the Mainland’s gro^vth requirements. It must be pointed out that 
Hong Kong has itself encouraged this role, for Hong Kong benefits from its 
relationship with the Mainland. Its role in managing capital for China’s growth reaps 
big rewards for Hong Kong in terms of attracting foreign investment and 
strengthening its financial systems in the global economy, and because of this Hong 
Kong will continue to serve in this capacity by fostering an environment which will 
be conducive to attracting foreign investors.
Chinese state-owned companies operate in Hong Kong’s major industries 
while receiving state subsidies, and thus the directors of these businesses face 
different constraints from those of other companies. This is certainly in violation of 
Hong Kong’s writ to maintain a level playing field for businesses, which will almost 
certainly affect Hong Kong’s reputation as a competitive international economic 
centre. If foreign companies see Chinese companies gaining special privileges such 
as stakes in Hong Kong companies at reduced share prices, they will quickly come to 
the conclusion that connections are what drive economic relationships in
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contemporary Hong Kong. Hong Kong companies and foreign companies operating 
in Hong Kong will cultivate relationships with Chinese businesses and Chinese 
government officials at all levels, who control the economy in China, and in doing so 
will hope that these relationships will help their own prospects for investment 
opportunities in China.
China has used Hong Kong as a tool to further its own economic goals. 
Knowing that this has been the model for their relationship in the past, there should 
be no reason why this should not be the case in the future as China continues to seek a 
place on the world economic stage. China still has a long way to go to become a 
modern industrialised nation, and for the next few decades China will still require 
large amounts of foreign capital to finance its growth. China’s leadership realises it 
needs the hope of economic prosperity and the maintenance of stability to justify its 
power and control of the nation. The leadership can only continue to do this with the 
contribution of foreign investment to maintain the required level of growth and 
employment. Hong Kong is the venue through and from which the majority of this 
investment comes. Chinese companies have used Hong Kong as a stepping stone for 
investment to the wider world and as a testing ground to expand their own operations. 
Some, by listing on the stock market, have had to make their operations more 
competitive and modern and have successfully used the stock market to raise funds 
for expansion. So not only has Hong Kong channelled foreign funds to China, but it 
has acted as a host for Chinese companies moving beyond the Chinese market. The 
dilemma for Hong Kong lies in the fact that Chinese interests will increasingly play a 
part in the Hong Kong economy, which could have negative consequences for the 
independence of the economy. Yet Hong Kong must work to maintain a separate 
identity from other Chinese cities in order to have a competitive advantage in the
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global economy. Because most of the foreign investment destined for China goes 
through the territory, ‘Hong Kong’s role as an international city is vital to sustaining 
its present economic position and indeed to its capacity to be of such significance in 
the economic development of China itself. (Yahuda, 1995, 54) There is an essential 
dichotomy as Hong Kong must remain an international city to attract investments for 
the Mainland, yet China, by using the Hong Kong economy, will compromise those 
very features of Hong Kong which attract foreign investors.
China may not want Hong Kong to become too international because it still 
wants to maintain some element of control. Thus it is courting Hong Kong 
businesspeople, or perhaps, in effect indirectly bribing them, and it is also 
encouraging investment and expansion in Hong Kong by Chinese interests. Through 
this it hopes to influence to some extent the direction of growth of Hong Kong, such 
that China can channel international investment funds through Hong Kong into much 
needed development projects in China. The economies of China and Hong Kong 
have been integrating for the past few decades, but it was in 1984 with the signing of 
the Joint Declaration that Chinese investment in the tenitory really took off as China 
interests felt confident about their own presence in Hong Kong. Once Chinese 
companies were certain that Hong Kong would become part of China, they made 
inroads in investing in Hong Kong industries, knowing that their status would help 
give them validity or a justification for operating in vital sectors in the territory. The 
problem with this investment is that, as state-owned companies from a developing 
country, Chinese companies are more vulnerable to economic turmoil on the 
Mainland, with the consequence that this turmoil could easily spill over into the Hong 
Kong industries through the Chinese companies; furthermore, they are more 
susceptible to turmoil in China in the form of fighting among the various levels and
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departments of the government. Chinese companies because of their government 
connections also present problems for conflict of interest or the exploitation of 
guanxi, perhaps with the consequence of an increase in corruption. Some foreign 
interests have felt less sure about their friture in Hong Kong, and have been realigning 
their investments to hedge their bets against friture turmoil in China which would 
undoubtedly affect Hong Kong, or a possible breakdown in the competitiveness or 
integrity of the economy. Hong Kong’s economy could be compromised in the future 
if China pursues its territorial claims and makes military postures in the Pacific with 
the consequence that foreign investment to China decreases. Hong Kong is 
invariably tied up with how China goes about pursuing its international goals (i.e. 
superpower, acquisition of land and oil resources in the Pacific) and inevitably will be 
affected by China’s military and international strategy: ‘...Hong Kong, while
benefiting from its links with the People’s Republic of China, must contend with the 
fact that its long-term political risks put constraints on the type and stability of 
financial flows that the city is likely to attract.’ (Lee and Vertinsky, 1990, 246) Part 
of this political risk can be attributed to uncertainty over the future of the territory. 
Hong Kong is not the master of its own fate, and because Hong Kong cannot 
guaiantee itself what its future development path will be, investors are justifiably 
concerned about China’s plans for and use of the tenitory. The operative words here 
are investor confidence. The economic success of Hong Kong depends upon this 
intangible, and were it not there, Hong Kong’s economic viability would be 
undermined. The fifty-year deadline for the end of ‘one country, two systems’ begs 
the question as to whether or not there will be a crisis in relations in 50 years time. 
Will Hong Kong be allowed to continue with its separate economic system? At this 
point, when questions will need to be asked as to the changes that might need to be
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made in the political and economic system of Hong Kong, Hong Kong’s economy 
could certainly be dealing with destabilisation.
Hong Kong is ultimately a city of business, and as such it is anxious to exploit 
investment opportunities in its economic hinterland. Hong Kong will still have a role 
for the West as a conduit of investment into China, as a base or regional headquarters 
for regional operations and as the best way into the Chinese market because it 
represents reduced costs vis-à-vis investing directly in China. This, importantly, is 
where it must differentiate itself from other Chinese cities, so that it will retain its 
place in the global economic community. Crucially, Hong Kong must continue to 
prove that it is more efficient to use the territoiy’s marketplace to invest in China as 
opposed to investing in China directly.
China’s policy toward Hong Kong
China has made Hong Kong an integral part of its economy, and yet China has 
allowed it to retain a separate economic system because it was the territory’s 
capitalist mechanisms which the Mainland needed to encourage its own economic 
growth. Ever-increasing trade and investment flows between the two economies have 
served to weld them together. Hong Kong’s economy is utilised by China as its 
international financial centre, because China is not prepared, structurally or 
otherwise, to create a similar financial enclave on the Mainland. The handover of 
Hong Kong in 1997 provided China with an established international marketplace 
which China has increasingly used to bolster growth of its companies and economy in 
general. China has consistently addressed the temtoiy from the frame of reference of 
how Hong Kong could serve the Mainland’s economic development, from the 
beginning of China’s own reforms, during the negotiations, and leading up to and
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after the handover. China formed a business-orientated government for the territory 
and has allowed increasing numbers of Chinese companies to conduct business and 
fundraising activities in Hong Kong. However, Chinese company involvement in the 
tenitory, because it is backed by the state, poses problems for the integrity of the 
Hong Kong economy. Both China and Hong Kong have a responsibility to make sure 
that the tenitory’s economic autonomy is not compromised in order to maintain 
investor confidence and thus Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre.
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Appendix
Data on Chinese companies were collected in Hong Kong from three major 
sources. Studies conducted by investment banks and asset management firms were 
important for the insight they were able to provide into Chinese business activity. 
The research utilised the firms’ detailed knowledge of the Hong Kong and Chinese 
markets to compile extensive reports into the operations of Chinese companies listed 
on the SEHK, otherwise Imown as red chips. I acquired these published studies in 
meetings with analysts fiom the various securities firms. A second source was 
published information from the Hong Kong Chinese Enterprises Association 
(HKCEA), the chamber of commerce for Chinese businesses in Hong Kong. Their 
membership directory revealed information about the number and scope of businesses 
in the territory. The HKCEA Annual Report detailed the history of certain companies 
as well as providing a unique insight into some of the reasons for Chinese company 
involvement in the Hong Kong economy. Data was also acquired fiom sources at the 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council library. These included newspaper articles, 
trade publications, and individual company reports.
The table lists 11 Chinese companies, nine of which have listed representation 
on the SEHK. Each company reports to a ministry or agency at the state, as opposed 
to the provincial, level. For each company its primary area of business is detailed, 
including what companies it may own or have a share in and in what other activities it 
may be involved in that sector. The table also specifies the secondary business 
operations of each company, if relevant. Typically, only the business activities of 
Chinese companies in Hong Kong are listed, while operations in China are omitted.
The evidence reveals that these 11 companies, which compose a fraction of 
the 492 companies which are members of the HKCEA, control a large portion of the
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Hong Kong economy. CITIC Group, which is the most successful of Chinese 
companies, controls 25% of Cathay Pacific, Hong Kong’s flagship airline, and 28.5% 
of Dragonair, the regional airline carrier. It also has a 20% stake in China Light and 
Power, a Hong Kong energy company. (These aren’t even its primary business 
sector, which is infrastmcture development.) Shipping and banking are Hong Kong’s 
two largest industries, and Chinese companies have a massive presence in both 
sectors. Four of these conglomerates control banks which have branches and/or have 
their company headquarters in Hong Kong. In the shipping industry, four of these 
companies have shipping and trading interests, and all four operate terminals at 
various Hong Kong dockyards. China Merchants Group operates the largest barge 
fleet in the territory as well as owning numerous other vessels which transport 
everything from oil to cargo to passengers. China Travel Seiwice is one of two 
authorised agents to handle railroad cargo between China and Hong Kong, and 
subsequently it has a 70% market share of Hong Kong bound rail freight. All of these 
companies but two own substantial property in the territoiy and are involved in 
property development.
While this list is designed to be as comprehensive as possible, not all Chinese 
business activity has been able to be accounted for. However, a range of sources 
were consulted and the evidence drawn from the research reveals the great extent to 
which Chinese companies are involved in the Hong Kong economy. One can 
conclude from this evidence that Chinese businesses have internalised certain market 
activities in Hong Kong which they believe are vital to their company strategy and 
operations. That is to say, Chinese companies view expansion into Hong Kong as an 
important part of their corporate growth.
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Glossary of commonly used terms and abbreviations
APEC
AMCHAM 
Basic Law
BHKF
CSRC
Co-Hong
Democratic Alliance for the 
Betterment of Hong Kong
ExecCo
HKCEA
HKMAO
HKMA
HKSAR
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, free trade 
organisation for Pacific Rim nations
American Chamber of Commerce
Constitution for Hong Kong under Chinese rule; 
written by drafting committee made up of Chinese 
and Hong Kong citizens
Better Hong Kong Foundation, group foimed by 
wealthy Hong Kong businesspeople to promote 
Hong Kong as a place to do business; typically 
supportive of China
China Securities Regulatory Commission
group of Chinese merchants entmsted with 
exclusively trading with foreign merchants at the 
southern Chinese port city of Guangzhou (Canton) 
in the first half of the 19 ’^ century
Pro-Beijing (meaning sympathetic to China) Hong 
Kong-based political party
Executive Council of Hong Kong, the Chief 
Executive’s cabinet
Hong Kong Chinese Enterprise Association, 
chamber of commerce for Chinese companies in 
Hong Kong
Hong Kong Macao Affairs Office, Chinese ministry 
responsible for policy formation regarding Hong 
Kong and Macao
Hong Kong Monetaiy Authority, Hong Kong’s 
quasi-central bank
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
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HKTDC
hongs
ICAC
Joint Declaration
Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 
government body responsible for promoting Hong
Joint Liaison Group
LegCo 
Liberal Party
MOFTEC
National People’s Congress 
Political Party Conference
PLA
PRC
Preparatory Committee
Provisional Legislature
SEHK
Kong trade
The traditional British merchant companies in Hong 
Kong, including Swire’s and Jardine Matheson
Independent Commission Against Cormption
Official agreement between the People’s Republic 
of China and the United Kingdom which allows for 
Hong Kong to be handed back to China at midnight 
30 June 1997; registered as an international treaty 
with the United Nations
body made up of Chinese, British, and Hong Kong 
officials who have been entmsted with managing 
certain aspects of the handover such as re-writing 
Hong Kong laws to agree with the Basic Law
Legislative Council
Pro-business Hong Kong-based political party; 
strongly supports executive-led government
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economics
China’s legislature
Political congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
which meets eveiy four years to decide policy 
issues and determine leadership positions
People’s Liberation Army, China’s national army
People’s Republic of China
150-member committee appointed by China, given 
the task of dealing with issues related to the 
handover; responsible for appointing the Selection 
Committee
Legislature appointed by Selection Committee 
which would assume power in July 1997 until a 
new legislature could be elected; created because a 
suitable legislature which would sit through the 
handover was not agreed between Britain and China
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong
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Selection Committee
SEZ
SOE
TVE
WTO
Xinhua
400-member committee responsible for electing the 
Provisional Legislature and the Chief Executive for 
Hong Kong who would take power in July 1997
Special Economic Zone
State-owned enterprise
Township/village enterprise
World Trade Organisation
New China News Agency—China’s unofficial 
representation in Hong Kong when the territory was 
under British sovereignty
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